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To provide some context, this thesis is the culminating piece in a series of research papers 
on the political and economic impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam. Just prior 
to the COVID outbreak in the spring of 2020, in fact, Professor Grimes agreed to take me under 
his guidance to pursue a project that studies FDI institutions in Vietnam. At the time, my 
research interest was inspired by discussions on Northeast Asian developmental states in our 
PO550 course titled ‘The State and Public Purpose in Asia.’ In particular, I was fascinated by 
how political leaders in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan built institutions that spurred high levels of 
economic growth. During the remainder of that semester, thus, I researched Vietnam’s FDI 
history and analyzed FDI legal and institutional reforms at the central level of the government 
between 1977 and 2008. That paper now makes up a large portion of Chapter 3. Over the 
summer, I then pursued a UROP project on the economic impacts of FDI in Vietnam. These 
economic insights shed light on trends in FDI inflows and informs my subsequent discussion of 
FDI reforms. During this process, I also conducted over 50 interviews with government officials 
(both retired and incumbent), business owners (both local and foreign), laborers and domestic 
scholars in eight different provinces on the subject of FDI in Vietnam. For the purpose of clarity, 
however, I only focus on the three provinces where I found the most empirical evidence of FDI 
success in this thesis, including Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong and Ba Ria-Vung Tau.  
Given this process, this thesis examines the politics of FDI reforms in Vietnam between 
1977 and 2015. Specifically, I discuss how local political actors pursued reforms that improved 
the country’s FDI institutions, using these insights to then explain trends in FDI inflows. 
Throughout this process, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the country’s leading political 
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organization, has led various reforms to attract FDI. In return, FDI has had a significant impact 
on economic development and political reform in Vietnam, surpassing FDI’s role in other 
transitional Southeast Asian economies. In Cambodia, on one hand, FDI has mostly benefitted 
the political elites and focuses on extracting natural resources. In the Philippines, on the other, 
FDI has been largely inefficient and continues to face various structural challenges. Under an 
institutional lens, a potential explanation for FDI’s relative lack of success in these two countries 
is that the political systems have not created the conditions needed for FDI to flourish. In 
Vietnam, rather, local politics have welcomed FDI. In return, FDI has benefitted both the local 
economy and political system, contributing to economic growth and political reforms at both the 
national and local levels. As I will discuss later, even in the face of many constraints, FDI 
reforms in Vietnam have been innovative, while the speed of reform is comparable to China’s 
between 1978 and 1997. Similar to China’s story, I find that most FDI reforms in Vietnam came 
from local initiatives. Studying how Vietnam built its FDI institutions, thus, can develop upon 
the Chinese literature and provide unique and valuable insights for other emerging economies as 
they adjust their developmental strategies amid the ongoing global pandemic.   
Introduction 
FDI began to pour into Vietnam after 1986, when the VCP announced ‘Doi Moi,’ its 
economic reform agenda and abolished its planned economy. Since then, the VCP has made 
tremendous strides to improve its FDI institutions. For multinational corporations (MNCs), 
Vietnam’s opening to FDI opened a market of 90 million consumers, while also providing access 
to 40 million cheap, yet educated labor (World Bank 2020). For the VCP, FDI provided the 
necessary capital for industrial upgrading, while also serving as a catalyst for political reforms. 
For the domestic private sector, an increase in FDI created new opportunities to enter the global 
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supply chain, while also serving as a source of technological spillover. For the domestic labor 
force, FDI brought high-paying and skilled jobs, leading to an increase in the opportunities for 
upward mobility. With such positive effects on the local political-economy, Figure 1 shows the 
dramatic increase in FDI starting in the 1990s until today. During this process, FDI became an 
important factor in the Vietnamese political economy. So much so, the Central Committee 
(CCOM), the VCP’s de-facto highest decision-making authority, has issued Decree 50-NQ/TW 
in 2018 declaring the FDI attraction as a key development goal and outlining the direction for 
FDI development up until 2030, an unprecedented practice in Vietnamese politics.  
The Timeline of FDI in Vietnam 
FDI had been important in Vietnam’s early industrialization: many argue that its 
exposure to the purest forms of FDI started in the colonial years, with European and Japanese 
corporations establishing complex production and trading networks in the first half of the 
twentieth century. The same argument has been made for aid and investments by firms from the 
United States and her allies in South Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. For the purpose of our 
discussion, it is important to recognize that local institutions have welcomed FDI during both 
eras. During the colonial period, local lords ensured that traders had access to accommodation 
and could practice their own religions and customs rather than abide by local regulations. 
Further, in the central city of Hoi An, the government invested heavily in port infrastructure to 
facilitate trade between different ethnic groups (Fukukawa et al. 2006). On the other hand, and 
despite its militaristic nature of governance, the South Vietnam regime ensured that bureaucrats 
with backgrounds in economics were present at all levels of the government, notably serving as a 
close advisor to army-trained mayors at the city level (Truong 2013).1 Such a policy, in practice, 
 
1 At the local levels of the Republic of Vietnam’s government (municipalities, cities, districts), the so-called 
economically trained bureaucrat would serve as the deputy to a governor/mayor with military background but had 
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ensured that the local bureaucracy could direct public investments in an efficient manner and 
manage private economic actors. As a result, South Vietnam flourished in the early years of the 
Vietnam War.  
After reunification in 1975, Vietnam closed to FDI, with the minor exception of a few 
joint ventures and economic aid projects from socialist countries (Pike 1988). When the VCP 
decided to accept FDI again in 1986, it implemented a series of reforms to improve central and 
local FDI institutions. Among the first wave of reforms were legal revisions and institutional 
reforms at the central level (Le 1995). As a result, incoming FDI grew during the 1990s and 
brought important changes in the regional economies of Binh Duong and Ba Ria-Vung Tau in 
the South, and Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh in the North. Contrary to the centrist view of the 
political elites, however, from the on-the-ground view, officials in these provinces argue that the 
local government’s ability to coordinate and implement policies was key to increasing their 
relative attractiveness to the FDI sector versus other provinces (Nguyen, M. T. 2020). These 
policies can range from infrastructural investment to tax incentives. Nonetheless, it is important 
to recognize that FDI inflows and the impact of FDI remained relatively moderate nationwide in 
the 1990s, with most provinces still registering low levels of FDI inflows. 
During the mid-1990s, growth in FDI inflows stalled versus the early period of reform. 
Two main factors account for this change. First, political leadership at the central level towards 
reform waned, while local governments did not have the capacity to attract and manage large 
FDI projects. After the reformist General Secretary Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet 
lost political power in the mid-1990s and eventually left office in 1997, no major political figures 
were able to advocate for continued reforms at the national level. General Secretary Muoi’s 
 
absolute authority in economic planning and policy implementation in non-military matters. Further, these 
bureaucrats would often be relocated between different provinces from two to four years at a time. 
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successor, the hardline military general-turned General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, on one hand, 
was more concerned with maintaining political stability, thus ignoring the economic agenda. 
Kiet’s successor, Phan Van Khai, although inherited many of Kiet’s positive legacies, lacked the 
political support needed to pursue further reforms. For local governments, a lack of leadership by 
the central began exposing their institutional weaknesses. In the realm of FDI policy making, the 
centrist system established in the previous era would further concentrate legal authority to central 
agencies such as the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) and Committee 
of State Planning (CSP). As a result, Provincial Chairmen and People’s Committees (PC) could 
not actively pursue FDI reforms.  
Second, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) reduced the ability to invest overbroad for 
investors from countries with the highest levels of FDI into Vietnam. Up until that point, Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan led Vietnam’s FDI list. The AFC’s impact on these three economies, although 
less significant in Taiwan, thus, reduced investors’ ability to pursue new FDI projects. In terms 
of sectoral distribution, industries that previously recorded the highest levels of FDI inflows, 
especially textile and tech assembly, also witnessed a significant decline in demand from 
consumer markets. As such, the demand for new projects stalled. These ‘push and pull’ factors 
led to an abrupt reversal of growth in FDI inflows up until 1997 (Figure 1). Nonetheless, this 
brief pause allowed the VCP to prepare for subsequent reforms, those that would fundamentally 
transform Vietnam’s FDI institutions. 
Starting in the 2000s, Vietnam witnessed a second wave of FDI inflows, this time 
followed closely by a rise in domestic investment (Figure 3). A combination of policy initiatives 
and institutional rearrangements contributed to this growth. At the national level, continued legal 
reforms reduced restrictions on the FDI sector. In particular, the 2005 Investment Law no longer 
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mandates foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to join joint-ventures to access key industries, while 
the restrictions on M&As were reduced dramatically (Investment Law 2005).2 As a result, 
manufacturing, real estate and financial services, sectors that were heavily protected throughout 
the earlier stages of reform, opened up to FDI. As I will argue later, the development of local 
institutions starting in the mid-1990s complemented these legal shifts and was key to increasing 
Vietnam’s FDI attraction capacity. On the FDI supply side, a booming global economy, too, 
contributed to the rising demand for Vietnam’s cheap land and labor.  
Vietnam’s accession into the WTO in 2007 further increased trust among foreigners in 
the domestic investment climate. By then, Vietnam had been building credibility with FIEs, 
gaining experience while building its FDI institutions. For export-oriented firms, the reduction, 
or elimination of trade barriers enlarged access for Vietnamese exporters and thus reduced the 
cost of relocating production (Tran and Billet 2009). Similarly, the removal of protective trade 
barriers on imports to Vietnam benefited all economic actors to some degree. For FIEs, the 
removal of trade barriers meant that they were able to purchase inputs at globally competitive 
prices, thus reducing their cost of production. As a result, FDI in export-oriented production 
projects has risen since. For SOEs and the domestic private sector, increased exposure to foreign 
competition meant that they had to become more productive to remain competitive. The level of 
domestic investment in technology, thus, increased significantly since. 
The entrepreneurial spirit that followed Vietnam’s accession to the WTO also spurred 
continued institutional reforms. At the national level, the reduction of corporate income tax and 
the removal of overlapping taxes improved the investment climate. More importantly, at the 
 
2 Prior to this period, the Foreign Investment Law restricted FIEs from investing in so-called key industries, 
including oil and gas extraction, infrastructure construction, real estate and financial services. The removal of such 
legal barriers, thus, significantly increased the potential FDI inflows to Vietnam. I discuss the effects of this legal 
opening in Chapter 4, which focuses on institutional adaptations at the central level of the government. 
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local level, many provinces followed Binh Duong’s footsteps and boosted investment in 
education and training to suit FDI’s demand for labor. At the same time, continued reforms of 
local FDI institutions allowed local governments to better understand and meet FIEs’ needs. 
Despite experiencing a slight decline in FDI inflows following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
thus, Vietnam has outperformed many other countries in FDI attraction in the region since. The 
regional distribution of FDI, too, has been more equal since. 
In the 2010s, Vietnam’s high level of economic growth and growing domestic market 
made the country more attractive to newer forms of FDI. Starting in 2013, investments in real 
estate, financial services, and retail gradually replaced export-production as the fastest-growing 
FDI sectors both in terms of number of projects and volume committed capital. Even more, and 
despite registering growing profitability throughout the FDI sector, FDI retention rates also rose. 
In other words, firms became more likely to reinvest their profits in new projects rather than 
repatriating their entire earnings to their home country (Lo 2018). These shifts in FDI 
concentration helped improve the committed capital to the number of project ratios, while also 
boosting the FDI sector’s productivity versus other parts of the economy.  
For domestic politics, the 2010s saw a new wave of FDI reforms. With PM Nguyen Tan 
Dung leading the central government, while ex-Deputy PM Nguyen Sinh Hung served as the 
Chairman of the National Assembly,3 the level of cooperation between the executive and 
legislative branches of government increased significantly. Higher levels of policy coordination 
 
3 NA Chairman Nguyen Sinh Hung rose through agencies in the central government, serving as the Director of the 
State Treasury, Minister of Finance, Deputy PM under the then PM Nguyen Tan Dung before undertaking the 
leadership position at the NA. His experience serving in the central government allowed for a clear understanding of 
how the NA can best support the central government in executing the national policy agenda. Further, having played 
an important role in the country’s financial system, Chairman Hung understood the importance government 
expenditure in spurring economic development. Throughout his term, he would work closely with the central 
government, providing the much-needed assistance, while also serving as a safeguard for its policy initiatives. 
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at the central level meant that legal and institutional roadblocks were easier to overcome. Yet this 
does not mean that local governments ceased to develop their FDI institutions. In the case of 
Dong Nai, Tay Ninh, and Long An in the South and Quang Ninh, Bac Giang and Thai Nguyen in 
the North, local actors learned from success models in their regions and increased the levels of 
investments in infrastructure, continued reforms of the bureaucracy, and invested in training and 
education. In return, FDI inflows to these provinces have increased significantly. 
Thematic Trends in FDI inflows 
Figure 4 shows the dramatic rise and fall of FDI as a share of Vietnamese GDP since 
1991. During the first wave of opening, FDI made up a significant portion of the economy, rising 
from just above 4% in 1991 to almost 14% by 1994. These ratios can be situated in the context of 
other Asian models of policy towards FDI. In the ‘Northeast Asian’ pattern, especially in Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan between the 1950s and 1980s, incoming FDI was always restricted and was 
considerably less than 1% of GDP. Starting in the 1980s, these countries allowed selective entry 
of FDI as part of their national industrial policy. In particular, they focused on attracting projects 
that had high potentials for technological spillover. After the late 1990s, Korea, Japan, and 
Taiwan relaxed controls over FDI, but inflows have never amounted to as much as 2% of GDP in 
these countries. By contrast, in the “East and Southeast Asian” model, the export-driven 
economies of China, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia have welcomed FDI and 
inflows around 4 and 6% have been common (Naughton 2018). In these countries, FDI has 
focused on exploiting low labor and land costs in the host country. Deviating from both models, 
Vietnam has been more reliant on FDI for industrial upgrading and economic growth than most 
other countries in the region. 
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Regional differences in Vietnamese FDI are large. As mentioned, during the early stages 
of economic opening in Vietnam, between 1986 and 1997, FDI was highly concentrated in a few 
provinces. For those ten years, Binh Duong, Ho Chi Minh City, Ba Ria-Vung Tau and Ha Noi 
received significantly higher amounts of FDI projects, registered capital and committed capital 
than the remainder of the country. In terms of sectoral distribution, oil and gas exploration and 
refinery, mineral extraction and infrastructure were the first to receive high levels of FDI 
inflows. Scholars have often credited these patterns to the supply-side-effect of FDI. That is, 
MNCs tend to focus on resource extraction and infrastructural investment when an industrially 
backward country opens up to FDI. As for the demand-side effect, others argue that the local 
government was willing to overlook the many negative externalities of FDI in these sectors, 
including environmental effects and an increased dependence on foreign capital for domestic 
infrastructural investment, because they were under high political pressure to speed up 
Vietnam’s industrial upgrading. As for the remainder of the country, FDI remained an elusive 
political goal. 
In the early 2000s, the emergence of more innovative policy tools meant that FDI inflows 
no longer witnessed such high levels of regional concentrations. For instance, the Central 
province of Quang Nam was able to use its Chu Lai Open Economic Zone (OEZ) to attract large-
scale FDI projects in key industries. By 2015, the province had registered over $18 billion in 
promised FDI capital, with over half coming from the power generation and hospitality 
industries (Do 2020). For comparative purposes, OEZs in Vietnam are similar to SEZs in China 
in legal terms, but OEZ authorities in Vietnam have less authority over major decisions. Another 
set of FDI policy innovations came in the form of increased attention to improving the quality of 
labor. In Binh Duong, the local government partnered with FIEs in hosting training programs for 
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internal laborers, while also attracting high-quality migrant laborers from other provinces. From 
a scholarly perspective, this practice allows for a discussion of FDI attraction as a form of cross-
provincial competition, while also explaining why FDI inflow experienced a significant decline 
in levels of concentration during this period versus the previous era. 
As Vietnam’s GDP per capita grew, FDI also began targeting domestic consumers rather 
than simply producing for exports. As mentioned, FIEs became especially interested in capturing 
the growing demand for real estate and consumption among the emerging middle class. 
Analyzing their methods of partnership, most real estate FIEs partnered with domestic firms to 
evade regulations on foreign ownership of domestic land, while firms in the retail sector and 
financial services tended to operate independently. Having already developed close relationships 
with domestic firms and the government, firms that entered Vietnam in the previous era emerged 
as brokers for potential investors. In many cases, they reinvested profits from export-oriented 
manufacturing to undertake equity stakes in service-oriented projects, thus explaining the shift in 
FDI concentration by sector and higher retention rate versus era. For the conversation on the 
politics of FDI, this new subclass of FDI firms provides more opportunities to analyze the 
relationship between different types of firms and levels of government. 
Outlook 
 Like in China after 1978, FDI began to pour into Vietnam after it began reforming the 
planned economy in 1986. As different levels of the government removed institutional barriers 
and local economic actors began taking advantage of market opportunities, FDI inflow has 
grown significantly. Since then, FDI has become an important actor in the local economy, 
contributing to significant portions of Vietnam’s growth. Today, FDI makes up around 6 percent 
of Vietnam’s GDP, well above the global average of 1.77 percent. Even if many skeptics view 
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this high level of FDI reliance in a negative manner, it poses a pressing need to discuss why and 
how FDI has become so fundamental to the local economy. As for political reform, the increased 
demand for FDI attraction among provinces has reshaped local political institutions, and FDI 
continues to be a catalyst for reforms at the national level. 
 Similar to the Chinese model, most meaningful FDI reforms in Vietnam stemmed from 
local initiatives. That is, even if the central government can implement national reforms, local 
political entrepreneurship remains key to explaining the patterns of FDI inflows in Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, it is still important to acknowledge that there are unique lessons to be learned from 
the Vietnamese case, especially since it has been largely unstudied. To better understand this 
process, I will analyze the politics of FDI in the context of Vietnam and its unique institutional 
arrangement between 1977 and 2015. Chapter 2 defines FDI as a political economic concept and 
surveys the literature on the political economy of FDI in Vietnam. Chapter 3 describes 
Vietnam’s FDI institutions and lays the foundation for the subsequent substantive chapters. 
Chapter 4 discusses shifts in the relationship between FDI and the central government. Chapter 5 
discusses the central-local government hierarchy. Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship between 
local governments and the FDI sector. Chapter 7 concludes and provides an outlook for FDI 
attraction in the upcoming years. Throughout this process, I identify several clear trends in FDI 
politics. First, it is that FDI reforms at the national level, although did improve Vietnam’s FDI 
fitness, only began exerting viable policy impacts when they were complemented by institutional 
reforms at the local level. Second, some provinces responded to the deteriorating central-local 
hierarchy in the 1990s by pursuing reforms that improved their FDI institutions. Third, other 
provinces actively attempted their own FDI reforms both before and after Doi Moi even in face 
of criticism from the central government. It is to these specific processes that I will later turn. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
Before discussing the politics of FDI in Vietnam, it is important to first theorize FDI as a 
political-economic concept. Drawing from empirical examples, one can argue that FDI has long 
been a key tenet of international economics. After all, generations of spice merchants have 
established trading subsidiaries in Malacca, while subsidiaries of the British India Company, 
despite being located in a colony, epitomize our modern perceptions of FDI. The scholarly 
discussion, however, did not theorize FDI until much later. At the microeconomic level, Hymer 
(1976) first characterizes FDI as a tool that helps firms to exploit international market 
imperfections and expand their production horizons to maximize economic benefits. Studying 
FDI through the lens of MNCs, Hymer finds that the decision to invest abroad rests on certain 
advantages in the destination country, including tangible assets such as access to raw material, 
labor, low transaction costs, and intangible assets such as patents. 
Expanding upon Hymer’s work, Dunning (1980) posits three preconditions for MNCs to 
engage in an FDI project. First, firms should have net ownership advantage over other firms in 
their markets. Just as Hymer argues, these firm-specific advantages can include tangible or 
intangible assets, so long that they reduce production cost for the firm and enable it to compete 
with firms in a foreign country. Second, it must be profitable for firms with these ownership 
advantages to use them for themselves rather than to outsource to a foreign partner. Finally, it 
must be profitable for the firm to exploit these advantages through production using physical and 
human capital outside of its home country. Simply put, the economic benefits from pursuing an 
FDI project must outweigh the costs of relocating the firm’s operations. Failing such conditions, 
firms would rather serve foreign markets through exports and continue to serve their local 
markets by domestic production. 
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Drawing from Dunning (1980), Dunning and Rugman (1985) and Hymer’s (1976) work, 
various scholars have attempted to theorize FDI as a macroeconomic concept. Early scholarly 
works have focused on explaining FDI as a tool to distribute international production. These 
scholars correctly portray how MNCs fuel the movement of capital across borders but fail to 
explain why they choose to invest in certain countries over others. Popovici and Calin (2014), for 
instance, argue that a country’s natural resources, population size, and market size determine its 
FDI attractiveness. Implicit in this natural wealth theory is the notion that natural conditions 
predetermine FDI inflows. Simply put, the quality of local institutions cannot influence MNCs’ 
decision to invest in a country. In reality, however, resource poor countries such as Singapore or 
the Cayman Islands continue to register high FDI inflow, whereas FDI inflow to resource-rich 
countries such as Bolivia stalls after its supply of natural resources has been depleted.  
From a different perspective, the pollution haven hypothesis examines the relationship 
between relaxed environmental regulations in the host country and FDI inflow. Analyzing 
Korean outward FDI, Yoon and Heshmati (2017) find that production-oriented firms tend to use 
FDI to bypass strict environmental regulations in advanced economies, offsetting their emissions 
to developing countries in exchange for the promised benefits of FDI. Yet when considering FDI 
as a whole, this is not entirely the case. Just as Dunning suggests, they find that even the decision 
to pursue FDI in some production processes focus less on environmental regulations and more on 
tax incentives or trade tariffs. Conversely, non-production processes, such as design or R&D, 
tend to remain in FDI firms’ home country regardless of strict environmental regulations. 
Although the pollution haven thesis provides a viable lens to analyze why FDI flows to 
some countries more than others, it implies two fundamentally controversial points. First, it is 
that, if a developing country with abundant labor wants to attract production FDI, it has to make 
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long-term environmental concessions. As the dependency theory suggests, such a process exerts 
greater negative externalities to the receiving nation than MNCs themselves, and thus increasing 
FDI inflow is irrational. Second, the pollution haven hypothesis implies that, albeit not the single 
determinant, the degree of environmental openness can make or break a production-oriented 
firm’s FDI decision. I, however, argue that MNCs’ perception of a country’s FDI institutions is 
the more important driving factor. 
As such, I focus on Wilhelms’ (1998) institutional FDI fitness theory. FDI fitness, as she 
defines, is a country’s ability to adapt to political pressures and build institutions that can attract 
FDI. With this in mind, Wilhelms outlines four types of institutional FDI fitness of decreasing 
importance: government, market, education, and sociocultural fitness. At the base of her pyramid 
are sociocultural factors, or “how people are able to adapt to business practices in the global 
marketplace” (Wilhelms, 100). Rather than implying that some cultures are inherently more 
compatible with development than others, Wilhelms characterizes culture as a constantly 
changing factor, one that shifts as the country immerses into the global market. Just as she 
argues, thus, “the more educated, traveled, and more integrated into the global economy a 
country’s citizens are the more they can help attract inward FDI” (8). 
Above sociocultural fitness is education fitness, which positively affects FDI inflow as an 
educated labor force enhances R&D creativity and information processing ability. The level of 
education, in this case, does not seem to affect FDI inflow, unless one views basic education to 
consist of the ability to speak, hear, understand, and implement instructions for FDI projects. 
Rather, improving education FDI fitness requires improving specific skills for sectors with high 
FDI concentration, such as the ability to understand manuals for manufacturing industries. In 
practice, thus, high levels of investment in training and higher education provides a more 
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meaningful explanation of FDI inflows than the average years of education within the 
population. 
High market fitness, she then argues, “means that markets for goods, services, and capital 
are well-developed and linked to one another via infrastructure” (Wilhelms, 88). In practice, 
thus, access to credit and minimal taxation can positively influence FDI inflow. Government 
fitness, then, focuses on how the different branches of government interact with each other to 
attract FDI. High government fitness, as she defines, “means that the legislature is responsive 
and transparent. For the executive, high fitness means that “policies are implemented in a 
transparent manner and ensures equitable treatment of all subjects under the law” (81). Popovici 
and Calin (2014) add that high government fitness includes minimal trade intervention and low 
corruption. Yet despite ranking these pillars in a hierarchical structure, Wilhelms concludes that 
they are related and interact in unison in different forms. In particular, high government fitness 
means that the state can efficiently allocate capital and spur market activities. In return, long-
term shifts in sociocultural norms can redefine a country’s national goals and thus its institutional 
arrangements, fundamentally affecting its institutional FDI fitness. 
In sum, Wilhelms’ theory implies that countries can actively improve their institutional 
FDI fitness to increase FDI inflows. Perhaps too, her theory provides viable grounds to analyze 
political agency in FDI attraction, or even to understand FDI attraction as a developmental 
strategy. That is, one can analyze how domestic policymakers have pursued institutional reforms 
to improve their country’s FDI fitness, while also analyzing the effects of FDI on the local 
political system. Scholars of political economy have attempted such a task in countries with 
similar economic models to Vietnam, especially in China. Recent scholarly works find that the 
increase in foreign capital, specifically those not coming from Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan, 
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has improved governance performance and reduced corruption of provincial governments (Lee 
and Lio 2016). Analyzing China's FDI reforms, scholars find that the increase in fiscal autonomy 
at the local level allowed local political actors to improve FDI institutions (Lieberthal and 
Lampton 1992; Ling 2018; Oi 1992; Mertha 2009; Ye 2014). Adaptive informal institutions at 
the local level, in this sense, serve a vital role in explaining FDI reforms in China (Tsai 2006; 
Shen and Tsai 2016; Huang 2008). That is, “without denying the causal role of elite politics and 
decisions, these articles contend that under certain circumstances, the etiology of formal 
institutional change lies in the informal coping strategies devised by local actors to evade the 
restriction of formal institutions'' (Tsai 2006). Leading these informal institutional changes, as all 
of the aforementioned scholars argue, is political entrepreneurship at the local level, including 
qualities such as motivated and capable local leadership, openness to new policy ideas, and state 
capacity for policy implementation. These works shed light on many similarities between the 
politics of FDI in China and Vietnam, especially the secular nature of FDI reforms. To fully 
understand how FDI interacts with the Vietnamese political system, however, one must consider 
its unique institutional arrangement with regards to FDI. Chapter 3 completes this task. 
Beyond these works, previous scholars of Vietnamese political economy have overlooked 
the political process of FDI, focusing on economic processes instead. One group of scholars have 
analyzed the effects of FDI on GDP growth, unanimously finding that there is a strong and 
positive effect of FDI on growth in Vietnam by increasing the capital stock (Anwar and Nguyen 
2010; Athukorala and Tran 2012; Giesecke and Nhi 2009; Kotrajaras et al 2011; Le and Le 
2002). Other scholars have analyzed the effect of FDI on trade, especially on the export of 
manufactured goods. The results in this research area remain mixed. For instance, some find that 
FDI improves Vietnam’s net-export after Doi Moi, thus explaining the relevance of the 
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Vietnamese government’s export-oriented FDI policy (Athukorala 2009; Pham and Nguyen 
2013). Conversely, others find that the relationship between FDI and net export is only 
significant after the Asian Financial Crisis (Vo and Nguyen 2011). Another group of scholars 
have investigated the local determinants of FDI. Notably, they find that provinces with large 
markets, more abundant labor forces, and high-quality infrastructure tend to receive higher FDI 
inflows (Nguyen and Nguyen 2007; Esiyok and Ugur 2015). In terms of technological spillovers 
from FDI, most find that the effect is positive yet still limited in scope (Tran 2006). Although 
these scholarly works accurately depict how FDI interacts with the local economy, they do not 
fully explain the underlying political processes of FDI attraction and FDI reforms. 
Among those that do analyze the political processes of FDI in Vietnam, their research 
remains either limited in scope or somewhat outdated. Gates (1995), for instance, studies 
Vietnam’s legal reforms at the national level from 1986 to 1995 and argues that “Vietnam has 
created its own gradualist path of transformation to a market-oriented economy, emphasizing 
foreign investment at an early stage of reform, and postponing difficult institutional changes like 
the creation of clearly-defined property rights and equitization of state-owned enterprises.” The 
main driving factor behind this gradualist reform model, she argues, is that “Vietnam’s decision 
makers are sequencing and timing reforms to fulfill political objectives of maintaining control 
over the reform process and retaining the party’s monopoly of power” (397). Nonetheless, she 
finds that Vietnam’s leadership was able to employ its policies on FDI successfully, taking 
advantage of its three economic attractions: low-wage labor for manufacturing industries, natural 
resources that are in high demand, and high profits for moderate risks in its service industries.  
Sanders (2014), on the other hand, examines why some provinces were able to reduce 
poverty at faster rates than others after Doi Moi through the lens of FDI attraction. He finds that 
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“increased FDI positively affects growth in the provincial GDP between 2002 and 2008, while 
also contributing to reductions in the poverty rates. In addition, he argues that “the positive 
historical legacy of capitalism in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) on the quality of FDI 
institution in the South implies that national pro-FDI policies are not sufficient, and that 
provinces in the North need to adopt more FDI friendly policies to remain competitive relative to 
provinces in the south. My research confirms Gates’ and Sanders’ theories, in that FDI reforms 
did stall starting in the late 1990s and that some provinces were able to attract disproportionately 
higher amounts of FDI than others. Even more, I confirm Sanders’ argument that FDI-friendly 
provincial policies are key to determining FDI success. Nonetheless, a new wave of indirect 
reforms followed that improved the investment climate since Gates last studied FDI in Vietnam. 
Similarly, an institutional argument provides a more complete explanation of why some 
provinces were more successful in FDI attraction than others starting in the 2000s. Building upon 
these scholarly works, thus, is essential to developing the literature on FDI in Vietnam. 
As mentioned, to fill this scholarly gap, I will analyze Vietnam’s process of improving its 
institutional FDI fitness between 1977 and 2015, discussing reforms that increased government, 
education, and market fitness at both the central and local levels. Previous scholars have used the 
1986 Party Congress, in which the VCP announced Doi Moi, to mark the beginning of 
Vietnam’s FDI attraction pursuit. As I argue, however, this process began long before 1986, 
especially in economic hotspots such as Ho Chi Minh City. Such a process, as I will also point 
out, only began exerting viable policy outcomes when legal, institutional, and market reforms 
policies at the central and local levels began complementing each other. On the economics side, I 
confirm existing theories and find that increased institutional FDI fitness positively influenced 
FDI inflow. By further explaining the political processes of Vietnam’s FDI success, I provide 
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several implications for developing economies that want to improve their FDI institutions. On 
the political side, this paper contributes to the greater conversation on Vietnam’s economic 
reform and FDI attraction as one of its developmental strategies. For comparative purposes, this 
paper tells a secular success story in FDI reforms, one that is similar to China’s model. 
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3. FDI in the Context of the Vietnamese Political System 
Introduction 
Scholars of political economy have made various generalizations about how FDI interacts 
with the local political system in various countries. As ‘pollution hypothesis’ scholars point out, 
relaxed environmental regulations in developing countries tend to increase FDI from advanced 
economies (Yoon and Heshmati 2017). In return, FDI’s concentration in resource extraction has 
incentivized local politics to implement stricter regulations on FDI as a whole. Other scholars, on 
the other hand, analyze colonial legacies to better understand the politics of FDI. The findings in 
this area, however, are mixed. In some cases, scholars find that being a former colony boosts a 
country’s ability to attract FDI. However, others suggest a negative correlation between a host 
country’s colonial legacy and its attractiveness to FDI (Osei et al 2020; Wang and Luo 2020). 
Within this conversation, the influence of colonial legacy on FDI inflows appears to depend how 
developed local institutions are (Glaster et al 2020). Given such explanations, one must 
acknowledge that, beyond the generalizations, FDI has also interacted with each host country in 
many unique ways. Vietnam is no exception. To better understand how FDI interacts with the 
Vietnamese political system, I will first discuss its FDI institutions. 
Structure of the Government 
 Vietnam’s FDI institutions can be analyzed through two separate dimensions: 1) between 
the central and local levels of government and 2) between the state and Party organs at each level 
of government (Figure 5). Indeed, all political agencies are subjected to the VCP’s direction for 
all policy matters. For our purposes, however, distinguishing between these four organizations 
allows for a more complete discussion of which was most powerful in FDI policy making during 
specific periods, and how these shifts in power dynamics influence FDI outcomes. After all, like 
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in China, political factions have developed within the VCP over time, differentiating themselves 
along the line of political liberalization and economic reform. The Party, in general, tends to hold 
a more conservative outlook towards FDI and the private sector, while the State favors reforms 
as a means to boost economic development. The central level of the government, on the other 
hand, tend to favor a more centralized political system, while local governments seek greater 
autonomy versus the central.  
Given these assumptions, several clear trends have emerged in FDI politics since 1975. 
Up until 1995, in fact, the central level of the government held absolute power in policy making, 
while the Party was more dominant versus the State. Looking at the central-local dimension, 
thus, this meant that the SCCI and CSP were more powerful than PC and DPIs. In practice, they 
diverted FDI inflow and determined which FDI reforms were to be pursued without consulting 
local agencies. Looking through the Party-state dimension, this meant that the Party, specifically 
the SCCI at the central level and the PSC at the local level, had greater power in FDI policy 
making than the state organs. With hardline Party leaders leading the nation’s FDI attraction 
agenda, thus, no meaningful reforms came from local officials. Changes during this period, thus, 
mostly came from ideological shifts after Doi Moi and legal reforms at the national level. 
The central authority and Party’s dominance deteriorated throughout the second stage of 
FDI reforms starting in 1995. By then, local governments had gained greater fiscal autonomy and 
improved their policy implementation capacity. Analyzing the Party-state relationship during this 
period, the Party also became much weaker at both levels of government because the VCP had 
begun valuing economic development over ideological stringency (Figure 6). At the central 
level, the CSP and SCCI merged to form the MPI, which served as the peak organization for 
national economy policy making. With increased autonomy and a clear developmental mandate, 
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the MPI coordinated FDI attraction with public investments in provinces with high potential for 
growth. Similarly, the MPI delegated many FDI policy making tasks to provincial PCs, thus 
reducing the strain on the central government. PSCs, too, began to focus on political issues and 
reduced their oversight over economic management. In reality, thus, FDI policy making became 
significantly more effective during this period. 
For our purposes, the rising role of local government and the state in FDI policy making 
provides ground for a robust discussion. Before discussing FDI successes stemming from this 
process, one must recognize that increased power for the state and local governments also led to 
widespread corruption and mismanagement of state resources in some cases. In response, thus, 
the Politburo has implemented various reforms to reconcentrate power to the central authority 
starting in 2015. Various cadre relocation programs and increased oversight on provincial public 
investments are key policy outcomes of such a program. During this period, the Party regained 
some power in FDI policy making versus the state at the local level by increasing its oversight on 
local investment spending, while the CCOM has outlined a clear mandate to direct FDI 
management and reforms up to 2030 (Decree 50-NQ/TW 2018). Such a bold political move, in 
this case, suggests that the Party wants to regain control over FDI policy making in the future. 
Although the effects of such a shift remain unknown, it will be an interesting topic of discussion 
for subsequent works. 
Although these trends appear to suggest a straightforward path of development for the 
central-local and Party-state relationships in Vietnamese FDI policy making over time, actual 
developments were more fragmented. Many political actors, in fact, recall that they operated in 
much less certainty than the stories they have told when looking back on the developments of 
FDI politics. One retired official, in fact, stated that “most FDI reforms he and the provincial 
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leaders championed had failed, and those that emerged as so-called determinants of success in 
any posthumous accounts are actually byproducts of what they had intended” (Nguyen, M. T. 
2020). Nonetheless, dividing these developments into stages that closely follow shifts in 
Vietnam’s reforms allow us to better analyze FDI’s interactions with the local political system. 
Conclusion 
 Despite a wide range of scholarly works on the political-economic effects of FDI in other 
developing countries, analyzing the politics of FDI Vietnam requires a deeper understanding of 
its unique FDI institutions. Surveying the existing literature, scholars have compared the effects 
of FDI in Vietnam based on assumptions about its similarities to the Chinese model. Yet as 
mentioned, the set of political and economic realities facing these two presumably similar 
countries differ greatly. To best understand FDI politics in Vietnam, one must acknowledge that 
FDI interacts with different levels of the Party and state differently depending on the institutional 
arrangement at the time. In the earlier stages of FDI attraction, FDI power was vested in the 
central authority. Once Doi Moi decentralized policy making, local governments became more 
relevant. Keeping this in mind, the next three substantive chapters focus on three different sets of 
relationships between the triangulate of FDI, central government and local government and how 
they changed over time. It is to this discussion that I will now turn.  
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4.  Institutional Adaptations at the Central Level of the Government 
Introduction 
This chapter examines Vietnam’s attempt to increase its institutional FDI fitness at the 
national level since 1977, mainly focusing on its government fitness as defined by Wilhelms 
(1998). For conceptual clarity, I use Wilhelms’ (1998) model and define a country’s institutional 
FDI fitness as a combination of its government fitness, which includes its legal framework and 
FDI policies, market fitness, education fitness, and socio-cultural fitness. Within my framework 
for analyzing the politics of FDI in Vietnam, this chapter focuses on interactions between the 
central government and the FDI sector. With this in mind, I first examine explicit changes in 
Vietnam's FDI legal framework between 1977 and the mid-1990s. Then, I examine shifts in 
other areas of the legal regime starting in the late 1990s that had a positive and significant impact 
on Vietnam’s openness to FDI. Subsequently, I discuss Vietnam’s tax reforms between the mid-
1990s and 2016. The last portion of this chapter concludes that these processes, though differ 
significantly, have increased Vietnam’s institutional FDI fitness and boosted FDI inflow. 
However, they only began exerting viable policy outcomes when they were complemented by 
reforms at the local level. 
Legal revisions before and immediately after Doi Moi 
         As Douglass North (1998) famously argues, institutional change consists of marginal 
adjustments to existing formal and informal constraints. In the field of political economy, the 
logic then follows that, even though political leadership can provide short-term sparks of 
economic development, institutional path dependency still rules (Kohli 1994). In other words, 
given existing constraints, changes in informal practices will not immediately follow formal 
adjustments. Vietnam’s attempts at legal reforms to increase its institutional FDI fitness is no 
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outlier; it closely follows this theory. In this section, I show that, although legal openings 
following Doi Moi may have suggested a radical shift in ideology, they did not provide any 
viable policy outcomes in the short-term. Only when different levels of the governments 
implemented supporting institutional reforms and complementary policies did these adjustments 
begin inflicting meaningful economic outcomes. It is to this process that I will now turn. 
In 1977, Deputy PM Dang Viet Chau took a political gamble and tasked the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Academy of Social Sciences with drafting a 
legal framework to attract foreign investment, launching Vietnam’s first formal attempt to attract 
FDI (Luu 2018). Albeit a bold political move, such a pursuit did not lead to immediate outcomes. 
Still influenced by a fear of foreign domination over domestic capital, the 1977 Foreign 
Investment Code emphasized the role of the state and subordinated FDI under the command 
economy (Le 1995). In terms of ownership, only SOEs could enter a joint venture with a foreign 
party, with the foreign party not permitted to own more than 49% of the joint venture’s capital. 
Not only so, the Code refused to outlaw the prospects of nationalization, only guaranteeing 
protection for between 10 and 15 years. In terms of language, most items did not show how 
MNCs could benefit from investing in Vietnam. For instance, the Code mentions “exemptions or 
reduction” of income tax “for a number of years depending on the branch of the economy, and 
amount of capital invested” (Foreign Investment Code 1977). Ultimately, the executive branch of 
government did not issue any supporting decrees nor adjust its command economic practices, 
leaving potential FDI investors without any clear direction. As such, the 1977 Code could only 
attract a single French pharmaceutical company over a period of ten years (Pike 1988, 247). 
Examining this Law under Wilhelms’ framework, at the outset of its FDI attraction 
pursuit, Vietnam’s institutional FDI fitness did not match its political eagerness for reform. 
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Specifically, while the legislative branch of government did not outline clear regulations, the 
executive did not provide any clarifications (in the form of decrees or supporting policies) as to 
how and which agency would enforce such regulations. This, in turn, prevented market fitness 
from developing, as no enforcing body was able to define the economic advantages for MNCs to 
pursue FDI projects in Vietnam. Perhaps political entrepreneurs were somewhat naïve to believe 
that a simple legal code can single-handedly improve the country’s FDI attraction capacity. Yet 
again, one must recall that even many of the most liberal political actors at the time did not 
understand market economic practices, let alone how to create institutions that would spur 
market activities. Another possible explanation was that, throughout the 1980s, large factions 
within the VCP were still not willing to concede their socialist economic model in general. As 
such, reforms that could potentially infringe upon its planned economy were outlawed (Truong 
2013). Following this line of argument, only when the VCP began recognizing the need for a 
comprehensive set of institutional reforms that Vietnam began effectively attracting and reaping 
the benefits of FDI. Regardless, this initial wave of political agency provided a platform for 
subsequent developments in Vietnam’s FDI legal framework. 
Leading up to and following Doi Moi, the VCP experienced a fundamental shift in its 
political-economic perspective. After years of seeing their planned economy falter, the VCP 
began favoring a free-market structure and private enterprises. Key political actors at the national 
level, thus, led the charge to “develop a multisectoral commodity economy in accordance with 
market mechanisms based on state management and socialist orientations'' (Constitution 1992). 
Put simply, they wanted to marketize Vietnam’s planned economy. Without a strong domestic 
industrial base, however, the VCP introduced the 1987 Foreign Investment Law with a desire to 
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“mobilize every means to attract foreign capital” for local development. It is perhaps in this 
wistful sentiment that the 1987 Law repealed, rather than amended the 1977 Code. 
Specifically, the 1987 Law permitted complete foreign ownership and outlawed the 
prospects of nationalization. Not only so, it permitted foreigners to invest in any sector of the 
economy, with special encouragement of investments in five key areas: 1) implementation of 
major economic programs, export-oriented and import substitution production; 2) use of high 
technology and skilled labor; 3) labor-intensive production that takes advantage of Vietnam’s 
existing material and natural resources; 4) infrastructure projects; and 5) foreign currency 
earning services such as tourism, ship repairing, port services (Foreign Investment Law 1987). 
Such an open legal framework, as many argued, placed Vietnam above both Thailand and 
Indonesia in terms of its openness to FDI (Luu 2018). Yet just like its 1977 predecessor, no 
institutional reforms followed the 1987 Law. After all, the SCCI and CSP, the departments that 
grant foreign investment licenses, remained subjected to control by hardliners within the VCP, 
and thus only granted licenses in areas that the VCP deemed less harmful to its political power 
(Le 1995, 51). 
Regardless, under strong political leadership by PM Vo Van Kiet, the state amended the 
Law in 1990, 1992 and 1996, and pursued key institutional reforms to support these 
amendments. Government fitness, in particular, increased as the SCCI and CSP merged into the 
MPI, the national peak organization for economic planning and public investments. Integration 
into the national peak organization for economic policy making, in this case, created stronger 
linkages between the FDI attraction and other areas of the government. Such a reform gave the 
SCCI access to greater bureaucratic tools, allowing it to respond to FDI investors in a more 
proactive manner. In practice, by the mid-1990s, the MPI was able to direct investments to 
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provinces with high potential for FDI attraction, while also acting as a matchmaker between 
foreign and domestic firms. On the legal side, the MPI leveraged its position as the champion of 
reform within the VCP to advocate for further decentralization of FDI policy making. 
With this increased power and dynamism, the amended 1987 Law attracted 1839 FDI 
projects, with a registered capital of $40.4 billion and an invested capital of $15.7 billion (Figure 
7). In terms of geographic distribution, and unlike how public investments under the command 
economy favored Northern provinces, the first wave of FDI projects consisted of oil and gas 
exploration projects in the Southern province of Ba Ria-Vung Tau and hotel projects in other 
Central coastal provinces. Subsequently, consumer electronics and garment manufacturing also 
boomed in the Southern province of Binh Duong (Nguyen 1992, 249). At the local level, many 
provincial governments began reforming their FDI institutions, with some even defying the 
central’s cautious FDI reforms to boost their relative FDI attractiveness. As one can argue, thus, 
once institutional reforms followed legal reforms, FIEs were able to pursue FDI projects in 
sectors and locations that made economic sense, while local leaders can actively alter incentives 
to attract FDI. With regards to Vietnam’s reform story, policies that arose from these business-
local government relationships also provided national leaders with examples as to how they 
would reform Vietnam’s entire FDI regime. 
To examine the 1987 Law under Wilhelms’ framework, the VCP’s ideological liberalism 
after the 1986 Party Congress did not lead to an immediate FDI success. Despite announcing 
radical reforms, thus, Vietnam’s institutional FDI fitness between 1986 and 1990 was still low. It 
was not until key actors began pursuing key institutional reforms that FDI inflow increased at 
rapid rates and positively influenced local development (Figure 7). In particular, an increasingly 
transparent legal code increased the legislative’s FDI fitness. In this sense, the continuous 
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revision of the 1987 Law provides a strong piece of supporting evidence. Likewise, a politically 
capable and streamlined SCCI rose to ensure “equitable treatment of all related subjects, both 
local and foreign actors participating in FDI under the revised legal framework” (Wilhelms, 
100). De jure liberalization, as one can argue, would not have had such profound implications 
without de facto efforts to open the economy. For most of the 1990s, thus, Vietnam’s 
government FDI fitness increased significantly. 
The 2005 Investment Law 
 Despite progress in government FDI fitness, starting in the mid-1990s, the looming Asian 
Financial Crisis and an unproductive domestic economy began exposing Vietnam’s low market 
FDI fitness (Figure 7). Within the domestic economy, SOEs began to feel the strains as they 
were unable to compete with private enterprises without government subsidies. Conversely, 
lacking developed financial markets and political support, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
lacked the necessary capital and freedom to partner with potential FDI investors. Such an 
inefficient domestic sector, as one may argue, could not possibly form supporting service 
industries for FDI projects, let alone invest in their own projects to take advantage of spillovers 
from existing projects (Mazur, Dapice, and Vu 2008). Without developed financial markets, 
strong infrastructure, and a competitive tax regime, on the other hand, Vietnam could not offset 
the costs of relocation for many potential FDI investors at the time. Once the first wave of FDI 
projects, which focused on heavy industries and tourism, has been exhausted, thus, attracting 
further FDI inflows required more comprehensive market reforms. 
Despite such a dire call for reform, by the mid-1990s, however, large portions of the VCP 
began fearing that further economic liberalization would undermine their control over domestic 
politics. With hardline General Le Kha Phieu in power, while the reformist-PM Vo Van Kiet was 
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forced into retirement, hopes for further liberalization were dull. After all, attempts at 
infrastructural investments and FDI reforms only appeared in a few Southern and Central 
provinces (Vu et al. 2007). In other worlds, any radical transformations like the 1986 Party 
Congress were no longer viable. Yet recognizing an inefficient domestic economy, other political 
actors still considered FDI as a viable source of capital. To satisfy both political and economic 
needs, starting in this era, FDI policies and overall economic reforms no longer came as explicit 
and radical legal changes at the central level; they became vested in more subtle legal 
adjustments and local-led initiatives. At the central level, incremental reforms that promote 
overall industrialization and rural development provided the solution to raising a consensus 
around FDI attraction and provided more viable policy outcomes.  
The first set of FDI-inducive changes at the central level came in the form of non-FDI 
legal reforms that created a more favorable investment climate. In 2005, the Investment Law 
replaced the 1986 Foreign Investment Law and established a major turning point in Vietnam’s 
FDI legal framework. For FIEs, combining the FDI legal framework with the Investment Law 
meant that they received equal treatment before the law versus domestic firms, establishing an 
equally competitive environment at least in legal terms. Further, the 2005 Law decentralized the 
authority to issue investment certificates for most projects to the provincial government, 
specifically to the People’s Committee (Investment Law 2005). In response to such a shift, 
several entrepreneurial provincial governments have established one-stop shops for investment 
promotion and management, often managed by the provincial DPI, to streamline their FDI 
institution. I discuss two of these models in detail in chapter 5, which focuses on the relationship 
between FDI and the local government. For this chapter, the important insight from such legal 
shifts is that the central government was able to recognize that it is not capable of managing all 
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economic actors since doing so will only strain development and the government itself and that 
the solution to this problem is devolving FDI policy making authority to local governments. 
Since then, three separate iterations of the Investment Law have improved the investment 
climate for FIEs, while a multitude of guiding decrees and institutional reforms have increased 
the authority of local governments in FDI policy making. By 2015, the Law has removed central 
oversight from over 20 industries, further increasing the ease of doing business in the country. 
Within this list, so-called strategic areas in which all projects require central government 
approval have been reduced to the construction of key infrastructure, including road, airport, 
ports and power generation, and natural resource extraction. In terms of central-local division, 
the 2014 Law has increased the minimum size of projects that need central government approval 
for issuance of an investment license to those with a proposed investment of over 5000 billion 
dong (approximately 200 million USD). In most cases, projects of such a size would also be in 
those key industries that require central government approval and oversight anyway. For local 
governments, such a shift increased their ability to propose new projects, while also giving them 
greater authority over existing projects in their respective provinces. In my provincial case 
studies, I find that the decentralization of FDI policy making allowed local governments to create 
new policies that induce FDI inflows. I discuss how local political entrepreneurs took advantage 
of such conditions in detail in chapter 4. For FIEs, the decentralization of FDI policy making 
created a more level playing field with local firms, specifically as the provincial one-stop shops 
for investment promotion and management can now resolve the vast majority of their concerns 
throughout their project lifetime. As a result, FDI inflow grew significantly. 
In response to the rising quantity of uncommitted FDI capital in the early 2000s, legal 
revisions also aimed to improve the quality of incoming FDI. Specifically, the 2005 Law requires 
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all potential investors, regardless of whether they are a local of foreign firm, to have a project 
research grant and approval of a preliminary project proposal from the provincial government 
before they can apply for a license. To attain the project approval, FDI projects have to undergo 
a strict screening process by the local government, with supervision by central agencies in some 
cases. During this process, FIEs would need to, and often with the help of independent 
consultants, conduct and defend detailed pre-feasibility and feasibility studies of their project 
against the provincial PC, outlining the potential economic benefits, environmental costs, and 
impact on the provincial economy over the project lifespan. For major projects, the provincial 
government would also require a detailed financial model, oftentimes accompanied by a credit 
guarantee by a financial institution to assess the projects’ feasibility. Such a process, although 
can be time-consuming and tedious at times, has significantly reduced the amount of unrealized 
projects, especially in the FDI sector. In Ben Tre province, for instance, many potential FIEs 
consider the cost of traveling to meet the provincial government and conducting feasibility 
studies as part of their overall investment cost, thus opting to either not invest in Vietnam at all 
or taking greater care with committing to their proposal project once they have already 
committed resources (Do, X. D. 2020). Following the project approval and licensing process, 
FIEs then need to comply with local regulations during the construction and operation phases as 
if they are any other domestic investors. Contrary to the previous era, however, FIEs would only 
submit to local government oversight, thus reducing the amount of interaction with the central 
government during the later stages of their projects. 
These legal adjustments brought two major changes in the size and types of FDI projects 
coming into Vietnam. Stricter regulations of what FIEs need to complete before they can receive 
an investment certification raised the barrier of entry for many FIEs, especially SMEs. As such, 
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FIEs needed to be more confident in their proposals before even considering any initial contact 
with the local government. The size of FDI projects, thus, has risen on average, while the quality 
of FDI has also increased (Figure 10). Despite improving the overall quality of FDI inflows, 
higher barriers of entry for potential FIEs also had negative impacts on FDI inflow from 
countries with minimal exposure to doing business in Vietnam. One potential solution for FIEs 
from countries with high exposure to Vietnam, including Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, is for 
industry associations or large businesses to complete the preliminary investment steps on behalf 
of SMEs (Nguyen, C. D. 2020). Upon completing the necessary feasibility studies for potential 
projects, the industry association or large business would then transfer the investment certificate 
to smaller firms in exchange for some benefit, be it a direct payment or share in the project itself. 
Contrary to firms from these countries, however, higher barriers of entry meant that firms from 
countries with little exposure to the Vietnamese economy found greater difficulties in pursuing 
potential FDI projects. Without industry associations nor business networks, FIEs from such 
countries, and especially SMEs have found it extremely difficult to navigate the local 
bureaucracy. Several Kiwi FIEs in the light-manufacturing industry, for instance, found it 
difficult to set up meetings with the relevant local agencies to discuss their potential projects. 
Once they found a domestic consultant, however, the consultant charged them high fees yet were 
never able to gather any project approval as promised (Do, X. D. 2020). Indeed, central-level 
agencies such as the VCCI or MPI have attempted to resolve such complications to improve the 
investment climate. Nonetheless, such a policy effect shows that Vietnam’s FDI regime is still in 
need of improvement. 
As mentioned, since Vietnam began revising its FDI regime through the 2005 Investment 
Law, the average size of committed FDI capital has gradually increased, rising from 1 million 
 36 
USD per project to approximately 2 million USD by 2019, while the aggregate amount of 
registered and committed capital has risen significantly. At the same time, more businesses have 
reported greater satisfaction with the government, specifically pointing to the provincial one-stop 
shops as key determinants of the country’s success in FDI attraction (Lo 2018). Although not 
entirely perfect, thus, the revised Investment Law has improved Vietnam’s FDI institutional 
fitness. 
Tax reforms 
The second set of indirect changes that positively improved Vietnam’s FDI institutional 
FDI are tax reforms at the national level. Although the bulk of tax reforms occurred between 
2000 and 2016, prior to the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the MPI had called for a series of tax 
deductions to complement its legal revisions. By 1995, in fact, Vietnam had reduced its 
corporate income tax on foreign investment from 38% to 32.5%, with tax on transfer of profits 
abroad ranging from 5% to 10%, and tax incentive rates ranging between 10%-20%. Further, 
projects in impoverished regions, which, at the time, consisted of most provinces, received an 
exemption for up to 2 years and a 50% tax deduction for the next 2 years. In practice, thus, most 
FDI projects would not be taxed for the first two years after recording taxable profits, only pay 
between 13%-16% income tax for the next two years, and between 26%-32.5% for the remainder 
of the project cycle. Along with the various legal and institutional adjustments discussed in 
Section II, such a regime positively influenced FDI inflow for most of the 1990s. 
As FDI stalled towards the late 1990s, however, the VCP began recognizing the need for 
more radical tax reforms. In 2000, the NA, its legislative agency, introduced the first round of 
Corporate Income Tax Laws, gradually increasing economic incentives for both domestic and 
foreign investments. In particular, the Law reduced the average corporate income tax from 
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32.5% to 30.25%, while also reducing tax on transfer of profits abroad to 3%. Albeit a small set 
of adjustments in retrospect, such deductions increased the potential benefits of FDI for MNCs 
significantly. As a result, an additional $19.3 billion of promised FDI and $15.1 billion of actual 
invested capital flew in by 2003, initiating a recovery from the 1998 slump (Figure 7). 
In 2003, an additional round of tax reform followed, reducing the average corporate tax 
rate to 28%, while also abolishing tax on transfer of profits abroad. In terms of incentives, the 
2003 Law increased tax exemption up to 4 years and the 50%-deduction-period up to the next 9 
years for projects in impoverished districts. In reality, thus, many FDI firms would not have to 
pay any corporate tax for the first 4 years after registering profits, only pay 14% income tax for 
the next 9 years, and 28% for the remainder of the project. Such favorable deductions, one that 
further increased the incentives for FDI, boosted FDI inflow between 2003 and 2007 (Figure 9). 
As Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 and began preparing to 
negotiate its membership in the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the 2009 Income Tax Law 
further reduced the corporate income tax rate to 25%, while also maintaining all previous 
incentives. As this process intensified between 2012 to 2015, the National Assembly further 
decreased the corporate tax rate to 22% in 2014 and 20% in 2016. Today, Vietnam’s tax regime 
stands comparable to most of its ASEAN peers, thus maintaining its comparative institutional 
FDI fitness within the region (Van 2019). The number of registered and implemented FDI 
projects, too, has increased significantly since (Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
To put such a process of reform into Wilhelms’ framework, indeed, despite improving 
government FDI fitness between 1977 and 1995, Vietnam’s FDI market fitness remained 
relatively low even into the late-1990s. Specifically, without a favorable tax regime, Vietnam 
priced a large portion of domestic enterprises and MNCs from pursuing FDI projects. As the first 
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wave of FDI, which consisted of investors that focused on exploiting its natural resources, 
slowed down, thus, the VCP began recognizing the needs for further institutional adjustments. In 
response, the National Assembly implemented a series of tax reforms between 1995 and 2016. 
Given that the revolutionary spirit from the 1986 Party Congress had died off by the mid-1990s, 
such reforms did not fall into the same traps that legal reforms faced between 1977 and 1990. 
Rather, a more incremental process of tax deductions gradually increased the number of projects 
and reduced the registered-invested capital ratio (Figure 8 and Figure 9). Further, as Vietnam 
began immersing into the global market, international regulations called for a new round of tax 
deductions and created an even-more favorable investment environment. Its ability to create 
strong linkages between government and market FDI fitness, too, significantly increased its 
institutional FDI fitness. By the mid-2010s, thus, Vietnam’s investment environment has finally 
mirrored most of its Southeast Asian peers (Van 2019). 
Conclusion 
As Wilhelms (1998) argues, increasing institutional FDI fitness requires a country to 
adapt to internal and external pressures and build institutions that can attract and retain FDI. As 
my survey shows, between 1977 and 2016, Vietnam successfully adapted to various internal (the 
call for economic reform within the VCP and an organized domestic private sector) and external 
(organized MNCs and IGOs such as the WTO or TPP) pressures and raised its government and 
market FDI fitness. In this chapter, I have focused on the process of reforming its Foreign 
Investment Law (1977-1998), Investment Law (2005-2014) and Corporate Tax Law (1998-2016) 
to show how political actors at the central level pursued FDI reform at different stages of 
Vietnam’s greater political-economic reform process. Just as North (1990) and Kohli (1994) 
suggest, I found that big bang reforms did not lead to immediate policy outcomes. In fact, the 
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1977 and 1987 Foreign Investment Laws could not attract sufficient FDI inflows without 
complementary institutional adjustments at the local level. Incremental reforms at the national 
level, on the other hand, provided more viable policy outcomes. Gradual corporate tax 
deductions and revisions of the 2005 Investment Law, in this case, provide a strong set of 
supporting evidence. Nonetheless, FIEs have more often credited Vietnam’s FDI success to local 
FDI reforms, arguing that the central government cannot fully understand and address the needs 
of FIEs throughout their entire project lifespan. In other words, national legal reforms do not 
make or break a firm’s decision to invest in Vietnam, the commitment from local governments to 
support these firms do. As such, It is to the role of local governments in FDI politics that I will 
now turn.  
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5. Decentralization of FDI Policy Making 
Introduction  
 After Doi Moi, FDI began flowing into Vietnam at high rates. According to the General 
Statistics Office (GSO) (2020), net FDI inflows increased from $180 million to $1.78 billion, 
growing at over 97 percent annually. However, such inflows were skewed towards a few 
provinces (GSO 2000). The southern provinces of Binh Duong, Ho Chi Minh and Ba Ria-Vung 
Tau and the northern provinces of Vinh Phuc and Ha Noi consistently ranked atop this list, while 
the remainder of the nation lagged behind. 
 Competing scholarly works have attempted to explain this phenomenon. Sanders (2014), 
for instance, finds that “the prolonged exposure to capitalist trade in the south led to FDI-friendly 
institutions after reunification.” (14) Yet Vinh Phuc, a landlocked northern province with little 
exposure to capitalist trade before 1986 also recorded high levels of FDI inflows (GSO 2000). 
Even more, many southern provinces that flourished under the South Vietnam regime, like Tien 
Giang, lagged behind both in terms of FDI attraction and economic development. Other scholars, 
including Anwar and Nguyen (2010) argue that provinces with better infrastructure, skilled 
workers and higher income tend to attract more FDI (194). These arguments accurately depict 
the relationships between such factors and FDI inflows but remain incomplete in that they 
consider them as natural factors. In Vietnam, so-called natural conditions are almost always a 
result of government policy and institutional arrangements. To understand the variations in FDI 
inflows, thus, one needs to analyze the variations in the government’s interactions with each 
other in the realm of FDI. 
 Acknowledging such a gap, this chapter examines FDI politics as a part of Vietnam’s 
decentralization reforms starting in the 1990s. Within the thesis’ framework, this chapter focuses 
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on how the relationship between the central and local governments influences FDI politics. For 
clarity, it is important to note that I undertake an institutional argument and argue the increase in 
autonomy for local governments after the decentralization reforms in the 1990s allowed local 
political entrepreneurs to pursue reforms that improved their provinces’ FDI institutions. 
1975-1986: A Centralized State 
For much of the period between 1975 and the late 1990s, policy making in Vietnam was 
done mostly at the national level. In terms of financial management, the central government 
controlled both the national budget and expenditure. Contrary to the Soviet model, however, 
Vietnam did not transfer resources from rural to urban areas to subsidize industrialization. 
Having suffered for over twenty years of continuous warfare, the main purpose of the VCP, 
rather, was poverty reduction. As such, the central authority focused on redistributing income to 
poorer provinces. In practice, thus, if a province is more productive than the national average in 
per capita terms, its excess output would be transferred to poorer provinces, not retained to 
develop local infrastructures. For major economic centers such as Ho Chi Minh City, such a 
system restricted investment in the provincial economy, thus leading to high levels of 
inefficiencies and misallocations at the aggregate levels. 
In the realms of FDI, all policies and projects were managed by the CSP and SCCI, 
agencies governed by hardline Party leaders. This meant that where and how much FDI inflows 
would be received in Vietnam was entirely subjected to the central level of the government, 
without any consultation of the local leadership. In practice, CSP and SCCI leaders often abused 
their institutional power to divert FDI in exchange for political favors. In many cases, foreign 
investors recall their early successes in pursuing FDI projects in Vietnam linked to their ability to 
identify and invest in home provinces of key leaders within the SCCI. Provincial leaders, in this 
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sense, were left to either hope that leaders of the SCCI were from their provinces or were 
somehow indebted to their province and thus would direct FDI as a means of returning a political 
favor. This structure of FDI governance, as many scholars have argued, prevented Vietnam from 
managing FDI and implementing FDI reforms in an effective manner. As discussed later, it was 
not until after the effects of Doi Moi became visible, specifically when the SCCI and CSP 
merged into the MPI and FDI decision-making became decentralized, that Vietnam’s FDI 
institutional fitness began to grow. 
1986-1995: Post-Doi Moi reforms 
 As the central-local hierarchy deteriorated following Doi Moi, local governments gained 
greater autonomy in FDI policy making. Three major structural shifts account for this change: 1) 
local officials gained greater representation in the CCOM, 2) local governments received greater 
autonomy over their financial budgets, and 3) local governments improved their capacity for 
policy making and execution. Although each shift influenced local governments’ FDI policy 
making capacity in a different manner, they all opened up new opportunities for local political 
entrepreneurship. After such changes, local entrepreneurs now had the adequate political climate 
to improve their FDI institutions, and those who were able to take advantage of these 
opportunities emerged as FDI success cases. 
Increased representation in the CCOM 
The first contributing factor to the decentralization of FDI policy making is that of 
increased representation in the CCOM for local officials. One major policy commitment coming 
from Doi Moi, in fact, was that the central leadership would devolve significant political 
authority to local governments. Yet having been highly reliant on central power in the previous 
era, many provinces did not have the capacity to outline and implement their own policy 
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agendas. To address this problem, the central government championed a series of provincial 
separations and sent central officials to new provinces to reduce the strain on provincial 
governments. During this process, the number of provinces increased from 44 to 64. Although 
not explicitly stated, there is an implicit acceptance within the Party that there must be at least 
one permanent CCOM member working in any province at any given time. At each National 
Party Congress, thus, the outgoing CCOM would nominate all provincial Party Secretaries 
elected at the provincial Party congresses, which are held several months prior to the National 
Party Congress, for permanent CCOM membership to ensure equal representation for all 
provinces at the national level. Further, between two and four provincial Chairmen in key 
provinces will also be nominated for permanent membership, while up to fifteen local 
bureaucrats will be nominated for alternate membership. With many provincial leaders having 
also ascended the bureaucracy into central leadership positions, once the number of provinces 
increased by almost fifty percent, while the number of CCOM positions remained the same, the 
proportion of de-facto provincial representatives in the CCOM increased significantly.  
For conceptual clarity, I employ Malesky et al.'s (2011) perception of the CCOM as the 
VCP’s de-facto highest decision-making authority, not the Politburo. As they argue, “in Vietnam 
the CCOM has had a more institutionalized presence and plays a more decisive role in national 
policy debates since 1991. Famous examples of their vetoes against the Politburo includes the 
rejection of the Politburo’s recommendation in 2001 that Le Kha Phieu continue as General 
Secretary of the party and the attempt to create a Politburo Standing Committee as the ‘highest 
leading nucleus of’ of the VCP in 1996” (410). Increased representation in the CCOM, thus, 
meant that all provinces received more exposure to the national policy discourse, while those 
with high numbers of CCOM representatives also improved their relative influence.  
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In practice, many provinces began leveraging their new institutional power to call for 
further decentralization of FDI policy making. With six CCOM representatives, Vinh Phuc, for 
instance, used its position to raise support for major infrastructure projects connecting to Ha Noi, 
the economic center of the North, and support for increased tax benefits for projects within its 
provincial borders. As a result, it was able to attract a series of major FDI projects in automobile 
assembly, notably those led by Toyota and Honda. With fifteen CCOM representatives, Ha Tinh, 
on the other hand, was able to raise central funding for major infrastructure projects such as the 
Vung Ang port and support to form the Vung Ang Economic Zone. With such improved 
infrastructure, Ha Tinh improved its FDI attractiveness significantly. For other provincial 
coalitions, the main focus was on further decentralization of FDI policy making. As such, 
subsequent reforms mainly focused more on increasing FDI attraction and policy making 
capacity at the local level. 
Increase budgetary autonomy: The case of Binh Duong 
The second major structural shift contributing to the shift in FDI policy making is the 
increase in budgetary autonomy for local governments. Citing Doi Moi’s reformist spirit, 
between 1986 and 1995, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) aborted its planned budgetary 
management practices, instead calling for “a decentralized financial management system and 
more efficient means of managing human resources at the local level” (MOF 2000). Simply put, 
the MOF wanted provinces to take up the burden of managing tax revenue and government 
spending. Within this new framework, provinces no longer had to submit their entire tax 
revenues to the central government for redistribution. Developed provinces, on the other hand, 
could retain at least 30 percent of their tax revenue for internal investments, while the central 
would also allocate funding for infrastructure projects on a case-to-case basis (Malesky et al. 
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2011, 405). In 2000, Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City both retained 33 percent of their annual 
revenue, three times that of the previous era. For provinces with higher tax revenues, such 
increased autonomy, albeit still not sufficient to maximize their potential, surely increased 
funding for internal expenditure. Increased expenditure, in return, improved the quality of 
infrastructure and spurred more economic activities, especially within the FDI sector. 
In Binh Duong, for instance, additional retained tax revenue starting in 1990 improved 
the province’s investment climate. In particular, after the 1990 provincial Party Congress, the 
provincial government directed large amounts of funds to BECAMEX, a newly privatized SOE. 
In many ways, BECAMEX resembles chaebols during the Park era in South Korea, only that it 
operates at the local level. In practice, it received cheap credit from local banks, while also 
receiving preferential treatment for government contracts. Structural wise, at least one PSC 
member, oftentimes the Provincial Chairman, would serve on BECAMEX’s board of directors. 
With strong financial support and a close connection to the political authority, BECAMEX 
confidently invested in industrial zones, affordable housing complexes and vocational schools 
that offer basic training programs for both internal and migrant laborers. Further, it constructed 
two key highways connecting to Ho Chi Minh City, the economic center of the South, while also 
funding zoning initiatives to maximize the amount of industrial land (Vu and Do 2012).4 In terms 
of cooperation with the private sector, BECAMEX used its position as a private enterprise to 
actively engage in investment promotion. In many cases, BECAMEX completed bureaucratic 
 
4 In Vietnam, a plot of land can either be classified as agriculture or non-agriculture. For non-agriculture land, 
subcategories include residential, government, national defense, public services, industrial, public infrastructure, 
religious, cemetery, water surfaces for production. In the 1990s and 2000s, Binh Duong was able to transfer a large 
portion of its agriculture land to non-agriculture, industrial land. Not only so, the province was able to connect these 
new industrial land to major highways leading to the Ho Chi Minh City metropolitan area. This policy initiative 
created a clean land bank to form industrial zones, increasing its ability to attract investment. Even more, the 
provincial bureaucracy also assisted firms and households that wanted to transfer agricultural land to industrial land, 
helping boost further investment in the subsequent era. 
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paperwork on the behalf of FIEs who rented land at their industrial zones, further reducing the 
barriers of entry for FDI into the province. As many FIEs recall, BECAMEX’s ability to 
navigate the local bureaucracy differentiated Binh Duong from other provinces. 
As a result, between 1997 and 2010, the province consistently ranked among those with 
highest FDI inflows, while also registering an average of 10.5% annual GDP growth, 
approximately thirty percent of which has been credited to FDI and FDI-related investments 
(Binh Duong’s Statistics Office 2017). Without increased funding, none of the aforementioned 
policy initiatives would have been possible. Likewise, without a model of governance that 
directs additional funds in an efficient manner, Binh Duong would not have been able to 
significantly improve its FDI institutional fitness versus other provinces. Placing Binh Duong’s 
reforms under Wilhelms’ (1998) framework, thus, increased financial autonomy improved its 
government FDI fitness, which then helped them attract more high-quality FDI projects. 
Increased policy making and execution capacity: Ba Ria-Vung Tau’s FDI Success 
The third structural shift accounting for the decentralization of FDI policy making is 
increased policy making and policy execution capacity at the local level. Increased policy 
making capacity, like the increase in budget autonomy, came after the central decided to devolve 
such a burden to local governments. After Doi Moi, in fact, central leaders felt as though 
provinces were better situated to implement their own policies (Bui 2020). To the reformist 
faction within the VCP, they perceived reforms at the central level to have been stalled in face of 
a strong political backlash from hardline Party leaders. Many others, on the other hand, believed 
that the central government did not have the capacity to manage all parts of the economy. Simply 
put, they believed in the Doi Moi rhetoric that Vietnam should break away from the planned 
economy, and thus decentralization was inevitably part of the process. Yet policy innovations at 
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the local level were never easy nor straightforward. They required high levels of political 
stability and commitment to FDI attraction as a developmental goal. The case of Ba Ria-Vung 
Tau best embraces this solution to success. It is to its FDI reforms that I will now turn. 
As the central government loosened control over local FDI policy making, Ba Ria-Vung 
Tau exploited its advantage of internal stability to pursue a comprehensive reform agenda. The 
concept of stability, in this sense, is not the concept of political stability in contentious politics 
scholarship. Rather, stability in this case refers to stability within the leadership. In many ways, 
my sense of stability is related to Thurbon’s (2016) developmental mindset, whereby a unified 
bureaucracy that was united around a common goal of economic development led Korea’s 
transformation under Park. For Ba Ria-Vung Tau, a similar kind of developmental mindset 
persisted around the goals of FDI attraction in an insulated PSC between 2005 and 2015. At the 
top of the provincial government, the same officials held the Provincial Secretary and Chairman 
posts for two entire terms. Not only so, both officials had held key positions in the province prior 
to their ascension, while also declining promotion to central-level positions despite offers from 
the central authority. The Provincial Chairman, on one hand, served as the Head of the DPI, 
while the Provincial Secretary served as the Deputy Provincial Chairman between 2003 and 
2005 (Nguyen, T. M. 2005). Continuous and stable leadership, in this case, allowed both leaders 
to develop and execute a common policy agenda. 
During their first term, the Provincial Chairman focused on preparing the provincial 
economy to receive FDI. Specifically, he relocated households in seafront areas with high 
potential for development to create additional land for major service projects. To prepare for the 
MGM Grand Casino Project, in fact, the province relocated over 1,000 households, clearing 
almost 200 hectares of residential land to lure the FIE’s away from the nearby provinces of Binh 
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Thuan and Khanh Hoa. Even more, he allowed Vietnam's Rubber Group (VRG), an SOE in the 
forestry sector, to transfer large portions of their unproductive forestry land into industrial land 
and invest in new industrial parks. Pursuing such an initiative was a political gamble, especially 
since doing so meant that the local government was outright defying national zoning constraints 
established by the central government. In nearby Dong Nai and Binh Phuoc, in comparison, the 
local government prohibited VRG from transforming its forestry land into industrial land until 
the revision of the Land Law in early 2010s (Nguyen, T. M. 2020; Anh 2013). Nonetheless, Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau pushed forward with its reforms, and as the Provincial Chairman once declared, 
“was willing to accept any criticisms from the central for pursuing reforms that would contribute 
to economic growth.” (Nguyen, T. M. 2020) Drawing from this spirit, between 2005 and 2010, 
the province directed an average of over 3% of its annual budget to revise the provincial 
infrastructure master plan and prepare project sites for roads that connect new industrial parks 
and tourism centers to major regional ports and consumer markets in Ho Chi Minh City. 
Simultaneously, the Provincial Secretary implemented reforms that improved the local 
bureaucracy’s ability to work with the FDI sector. After announcing FDI attraction as a major 
political goal in 2005, he relocated young cadres in the Provincial Government and DPI to key 
positions in district-level organizations for a period of between two to three years (Ba ria-Vung 
Tau Party Organization 2010). With leaders who were both committed to and familiar with the 
province’s developmental goals in district governments, policy coordination improved 
significantly. As one DPI official states, “having supportive district governments meant that the 
prospects for infighting decreased significantly.” (Nguyen 2020). Even more, patterns of 
ascension show that these cadres often end up in key leadership positions once they return to the 
provincial government, which means that their connections in district governments can further 
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spur development in internal cohesion. Out of fifteen members in Ba Ria-Vung Tau’s current 
PSC, in fact, nine had emerged from such a program. Under Wilhelms’ (1998) framework, these 
reforms placed Ba Ria-Vung Tau in a favorable position to significantly boost its FDI 
government and market fitness. 
During their second term, the Provincial Secretary and Chairman used their policy 
foundation to promote FDI in new service areas and industrial parks. On the Party side, the 2010 
Provincial Party Congress Decree states the need to “improve the provincial FDI institutions, 
especially towards the service and manufacturing industries.” Drawing upon this spirit, the PC 
focused on investment promotion in the service industry, specifically on integrated resort 
projects. With strong internal leadership, in fact, the PSC worked with several FIEs in gathering 
the central’s approval of a casino license, while also working closely with the chief investor, 
MGM Grand to set up the project site. Bureaucratic steps that would take up to seven years in 
other provinces, such as with the Sun City Casino project in Quang Nam province, only took 
over two years in Ba Ria-Vung Tau. Notably, the project did not suffer from any complication 
regarding its land use rights, nor locals infringing on the project site.  
Further, the province developed its road infrastructures and promoted investment in its 
seaport to boost connectivity for the industrial sector. In terms of public investments, the 
province focused on highways connecting to other industrial areas in the region, including Binh 
Duong, Dong Nai, and Ho Chi Minh City. By 2015, the time of travel between Ho Chi Minh 
City and Ba Ria-Vung Tau’s Cai Mep-Thi Vai port was reduced to just under two hours, versus 
the four-hour travel time in 2008. For firms, a reduction in transportation time saved valuable 
logistics costs, while also expanding the range of goods that the Cai Mep-Thi Vai port can 
handle. In terms of collaboration with the private sector, the PC worked closely with Gemadept 
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to upgrade the Cai Mep-Thi Vai port and expand the port’s customer base, effectively reaching a 
sufficient economy of scale to connect the Southeast to major transshipment hubs in East Asia 
without having to transfer goods through Singapore. By 2015, thus, the average transportation 
cost of a container from Cai Mep-Thi Vai to Shanghai was reduced to 600 dollar per container, 
versus the 3000 dollars per container in 2008 (Nguyen, T. M. 2020). Since then, Ba Ria-Vung 
Tau’s FDI inflows has risen beyond the national average, emerging as the next industrial center 
in the Southeast.  
For FIEs, Ba Ria-Vung Tau’s clean land bank, high quality infrastructure, and 
cooperative bureaucracy made the province an attractive destination. To place its achievements 
under Wilhelm’s framework, Ba Ria-Vung Tau has developed its FDI government and market 
fitness to relatively high levels by 2015. Such successes, however, would not have been possible 
without the preparations done by the two provincial leaders during their first term of leadership. 
Yet again, without their continuous leadership and ability to limit political infighting, Ba Ria-
Vung Tau would not have been able to actualize its potential. For comparative purposes, despite 
having more policy advantages, especially with the Chu Lai OEZ, the central province of Quang 
Nam, for instance, could not actualize the development plans outlined by their outgoing leaders 
until today. 
Conclusion 
 Starting in the 1990s, FDI began flowing into Vietnam at significant rates. At the national 
level, net FDI inflows increased by over ten times between 1990 and 1996, jumping from USD 
180 million to USD 2.37 billion (GSO 2020). Placing FDI in the context of the local economy, 
FDI during this period contributed an average of seven percent to the national GDP. Although 
data about the labor force are lacking, personal accounts from officials and investors in provinces 
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where the levels of FDI inflows were high recall that local labor made up the majority of 
employment by the FDI sector. Yet despite such an optimistic picture, FDI regional distribution 
remained skewed to a few economic centers. The remainder of the country, thus, lagged behind.  
Competing scholarly theories have attempted to explain such a phenomenon, citing path 
dependence from the colonial era, natural conditions and structural factors in provinces that were 
more successful in FDI attraction. Analyzing the politics of FDI between 1990 and 2015, 
however, I found that an institutional argument provides a more complete explanation of why 
some provinces received greater FDI inflows than others. In particular, when Vietnam underwent 
an extensive period of decentralization after Doi Moi, political entrepreneurs at the local level 
found an opportunity to pursue reforms that increased their FDI institutional fitness, thus 
attracting more FDI inflows. In other words, when local governments became relatively stronger 
versus the central, their FDI policy making capacity and the efficacy of their FDI policies also 
increased. In Binh Duong’s case, increased autonomy over the local budget allowed for 
investment in infrastructure and training programs for local cadres that increased the province’s 
FDI institutional fitness. For Ba Ria-Vung Tau, internal political stability allowed the local 
bureaucracy to set and implement FDI reforms that boosted FDI inflows. In both of these 
provinces, the increased FDI boosted the level of economic development, while also creating an 
abundance of high-quality jobs for local laborers. These two success stories, thus, provide key 
lessons for the central government as it considers how to better the country’s FDI attraction 
framework. Nonetheless, other FDI reforms also brought important changes in other provinces. It 




6. Local Political Leadership in FDI Reforms 
Introduction 
 FDI data shows a sharp increase in FDI inflows at the national level starting in the 1990s 
(Figure 2). Yet as mentioned, the distribution of FDI inflows remains skewed towards a small 
number of provinces. The Southern provinces of Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong and Ba Ria-
Vung Tau and the Northern provinces of Ha Noi and Vinh Phuc consistently rank atop the 
national hierarchy for FDI attraction (Figure 11). In Chapter 4, I focused on how legal shifts at 
the national level boosted Vietnam's FDI fitness. In Chapter 5, I then argued that the 
decentralization of policy making following Doi Moi created an environment in which local 
political entrepreneurs were able to pursue reforms that improved their FDI institutions. FDI 
reforms, in return, led to a proportionately higher increase in FDI inflows in these provinces. 
These arguments, though provide an adequate explanation of why some provinces registered 
higher FDI inflows than others, do not fully explain why such variations are so extreme. 
This chapter, thus, examines specifically how two local governments developed their FDI 
institutions. Whereas chapter 5 focuses on how local political entrepreneurs took advantage of 
the central’s decentralization reforms, this chapter focuses on FDI reforms that started from 
changes within the local bureaucracy. With this in mind, I argue that when local governments 
began considering the private sector, specifically FDI, as a potential contributor to economic 
development, they were able to devise more innovative reforms that strengthened their FDI 
institutions. Within my framework, this chapter focuses on the relationship between FDI and 
local governments. In my case studies, this shift in attitude can develop either before or after Doi 
Moi, suggesting that similar reforms are still viable even today. In Ho Chi Minh City, the private 
sector-friendly institutions that developed before Doi Moi laid the foundation for the province’s 
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subsequent FDI success. For Binh Duong, on the other hand, political leadership after Doi Moi 
spurred many innovative FDI reforms.  
This argument may seem simplistic at first glance but developing FDI-friendly 
institutions remains a major challenge in many provinces even today. In Quang Nam, FIE 
managers reported that many local officials still consider FDI as a source of extraction, focusing 
on demanding favors from FIEs rather than cooperating for the good of the local economy (Lo 
2018). Even more, most provinces that now have FDI-friendly institutions were once highly 
hostile towards FIEs. For instance, the Northern province of Bac Giang did not formally 
recognize FDI attraction as a key goal until as late as 2010. Intuitively, however, a positive 
attitude towards the FDI sector allows the local government to coordinate and execute policies 
that better meet the demands of FDI firms. As Wilhelms (1998) points out, acceptance of FDI 
and foreign involvement in the local economy is a major precursor for high FDI institutional 
fitness. Understanding how some provinces were more successful at actively developing FDI 
institutions than others, thus, is key to understanding the politics of FDI in Vietnam. 
Pre-Doi Moi: Ho Chi Minh City’s “Jumping the Fences” Reforms 
 In the years prior to Doi Moi, most of the Vietnamese government was unwelcoming of 
FDI. In many ways, this is due to the central government’s anti-FDI position, especially FDI 
from capitalist countries. Having emerged from over twenty years of continuous wars, hardliners 
within the VCP were still reluctant to establish basic diplomatic relations, let alone allow 
investors from such countries to own assets and, as the head of the SCCI once put, “extract 
resources to enrich their capitalist economies at the expense of the Vietnamese people.” In their 
eyes, FDI was seen as tools for neocolonialism, and thus such a position would not change unless 
a major political shift were to occur. Of course, this meant that the central government ignored 
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proposals for FDI projects from capitalist countries, resorting only to foreign aid projects from 
Soviet or former-Soviet countries. For local governments, centralized control over FDI policy 
making and FDI attraction meant that most of the state apparatus was reluctant to discuss 
potential projects with FDI investors in fear of political backlash by the central government. 
 Several other structural constraints also prevented local government officials from 
interacting with the FDI sector on meaningful terms. First, for those wanting to pursue FDI 
projects, potential FIEs and local governments would first have to go through the SCCI and CSP 
for several rounds of approvals before they can begin discussing the most general terms of 
cooperation. Second, these agencies would often only approve a project as a political favor for 
the province, and with power vested in the central government, returning political favors to local 
officials was rare. As a result, provincial governments had little incentive to propose their own 
FDI projects, while firms refrained from contacting local governments before going through the 
SCCI (Bui 2020). Analyzing Vietnam’s FDI attraction framework during this period, high levels 
of restrictions disincentivized local governments from pursuing FDI reforms. Placing such an 
insight into Wilhelms’ (1998) framework, Vietnam’s FDI government fitness at the local level 
during this period, thus, was virtually non-existent. 
Nonetheless, Ho Chi Minh City still emerged as a success case in investment promotion 
during this period, laying the foundation for its subsequent success in FDI attraction. Given 
Vietnam’s hierarchy, however, meaningful changes cannot come from the lowest levels of the 
provincial bureaucracy. The need to build a consensus around a policy issue within the PSC 
before the PC can execute a policy, in fact, prevents any major reforms from officials not 
represented in the PSC. Further, with most of the legal and political authority vested in the Party 
organization, most changes at the local level during this period came from within this group of 
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so-called local elites. As a result, my discussion of local political leadership focuses on the PSC, 
with the Provincial Secretary and Chairman being the two most important actors. Conversely, 
although local DPIs, SEZs, and district governments have occasionally shown positive influence 
on some provinces’ FDI reform, these sparks of political entrepreneurship are rare and often lose 
steam after a short period. For this reason, I will not discuss these cases. 
The first contributing factor to Ho Chi Minh City’s FDI success is strong leadership 
towards reform and firmness in face of challenges from the central government prior to Doi Moi. 
The Ho Chi Minh City PSC, in particular, actually laid the foundation for Doi Moi by protecting 
and promoting its ‘jumping the fences’ initiative5, a policy that focuses on marketizing the local 
economy. Despite his harsh stance on political matters, in fact, Provincial Secretary Nguyen Van 
Linh was a staunch advocate for relaxation of legal control over firms, albeit SOE or private 
enterprises. During the 1980s, he and Provincial Chairman Vo Van Kiet took frequent visits to 
SOEs, while also “spending much of their free time discussing the legal obstacles faced by SOEs 
managers when attempting to improve productivity” (Truong 2013, 315). Upon gathering 
sufficient insights, they would then spend lengthy hours discussing potential reforms with the 
PSC. In such meetings, both Secretary Linh and Chairman Kiet’s personal secretaries recall that 
they always allowed provincial bureaucrats to speak freely about their ideas for reforms, 
promising to address all institutional roadblocks to improve the province’s investment climate.  
Above such supportive practices, Ho Chi Minh City’s leaders also remained firm in face 
of challenges against their reforms. When central officials publicly criticized their ‘jumping the 
 
5 In face of a stagnant economy after reunification, the ‘Jumping the fence’ initiative focused on allowing SOEs and 
private enterprises (which operated illegally because the legal framework prohibited private ownership of firms) to 
take advantage of legal gaps and engage in market activities. Ho Chi Minh City was one of many Southern 
provinces engaged in such an initiative. With its relatively stronger political power, however, its successes had more 
impact on the national policy discourse. 
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fence’ initiative, specifically how they endorsed extralegal trade activities in 1982, Secretary 
Linh simply nodded in agreement. Without confronting central leaders, he then asked Chairman 
Kiet and the Head of the City’s Economic Commission to explain why the central government’s 
criticisms had no rationale, citing the province’s high growth levels versus the remainder of the 
country’s lagging economy as a call for a fundamental reform of the socialist model (Truong 
2013).6 Although central leaders did not verbally accept his counter-arguments at the meeting, 
Decree 01, which was issued a few days later, did not recommend any potential changes to the 
city's economic policy agenda. So much so, even if the Decree stated that “the country needs to 
establish a functioning socialist economy before establishing a communist economy,” it also 
stated, “the Party needs to begin endorsing partnerships between socialist economic actors and 
new actors in the economy” (Politburo 1982). In other words, Secretary Linh’s and Chairman 
Kiet’s political adeptness helped protect the province’s economic reforms, while also casting 
meaningful influence in laying the first foundations for Doi Moi itself. 
Building upon this momentum, Secretary Linh then organized a gathering between 
Vietnam’s three highest-ranking officials, General Secretary and SOE managers who were 
engaged with the province’s ‘jumping the fences’ initiative in the summer of 1983. Over the 
course of four days, he ensured that the three central leaders diligently listen to reports from the 
City’s delegation and, as one of the delegation members later noted, “even asked SOE managers 
to educate them on market activities and how they can manage new economic actors.” (Nguyen, 
H. V. 2015) After having accepted that the province’s economic growth does signify the need to 
 
6 Before the meeting between the Politburo and the Ho Chi Minh City’s Party Organization, General Secretary Le 
Duan, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Head of the Central Propaganda Division To Huu all verbally criticized 
the Ho Chi Minh Party Organization for ‘failing to align economic policy with the Party’s goal of establishing a 
socialist economy.’ Even during the meeting, General Secretary Le Duan proclaimed: “the Ho Chi Minh Provincial 
Secretary should resign, the same goes with the Provincial Chairman.” 
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reform the socialist model, and contrary to their hardline stance at official meetings, the three 
Politburo members paid full attention to the unorthodox means by which these entrepreneurs 
have been able to boost productivity even in face of various institutional constraints. 
Immediately following this rendezvous, President Truong Chinh, who would later serve 
as the General Secretary, asked the provincial government to organize a visit to firms that were 
engaged with its ‘jumping the fence’ initiative. This time, Chairman Kiet accompanied the 
President during his visits. At each company, President Chinh spent lengthy hours listening to 
managers and laborers share their experiences with market economic practices. Notably, he even 
listened to the Phuoc Long textile company’s accounting division explain how they maintained 
two separate logs, one that used fixed prices established by the Price Commission, but made no 
economic sense, and the other that used market prices, but had no legal value. As Nguyen Van 
Huan, Chairman Kiet’s personal secretary later recalls, although Chairman Kiet did not make 
any formal statement during the visits that day, he firmly believed that “inviting Politburo 
members to visit factories and meet SOE managers was the way to gradually educate them that 
planned practices no longer made economic sense” (Nguyen, H. V. 2015). Evidently, just as the 
Chairman had calculated, President Chinh’s son later recalls that such visits fundamentally 
changed his father’s view of the private sector. So much so, he recalls President Chinh 
proclaiming, “what I’ve heard in Ha Noi about the Southern economy has always been wrong” 
immediately after his trip. That is to show, not only did the Ho Chi Minh City leadership 
welcome firms' contribution to the economy, they also actively engaged central leaders in 
pursuing similar reforms for the remainder of the country. 
Such an entrepreneurial spirit continued with Ho Chi Minh City well after Doi Moi. 
Building upon its private sector-friendly institutions, local officials in Ho Chi Minh City actively 
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engaged FIEs in many of the province’s major projects. Most notably, FIEs from a multitude of 
countries have contributed to the provinces’ most important real estate and infrastructure 
projects, including Taiwanese FIEs in the Phu My Hung residential area, Japanese FIEs in the 
Thu Thiem tunnel and a conglomerate of Japanese and Chinese FIEs in the city’s first subway 
network. Elsewhere, many major FIEs have chosen Ho Chi Minh City to establish branches for 
their country office, with some even using Ho Chi Minh City as their regional hub. As a result, 
Ho Chi Minh City consistently ranks among the top of the country in terms of FDI attraction 
(Figure 11). Without strong political leadership in face of continued challenges by the central 
government, thus, Ho Chi Minh City would not have developed such FDI-friendly institutions. 
Yet as mentioned, I argue that this spirit does not need to necessarily come from the pre-Doi Moi 
era alone. Such a heavy emphasis on path dependence suggests that other provinces, especially 
those with weaker political institutions, do not have any potential to develop strong FDI 
attraction institutions. Actual FDI data shows the exact opposite. It is to how similar attitudes 
developed in other provinces after Doi Moi that I will now turn. 
Post-Doi Moi: Binh Duong’s Political Entrepreneurship 
Doi Moi brought a new mindset towards the private economic actors, more specifically, 
towards FDI firms. Like in China, its reformist rhetoric created new opportunities for local 
political entrepreneurs to pursue FDI reforms. Given such a favorable political climate, provinces 
with little exposure to private investment before Doi Moi also emerged as FDI success cases. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Binh Duong, for instance, took advantage of these new political 
openings to improve their FDI institutions. However, a multitude of other changes that started 
within the local bureaucracy also contributed to its success. Today, the province consistently 
ranks among the top five provinces with the highest levels of FDI inflows, only failing to 
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outperform the country’s two largest metropolitan areas, Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi. To 
understand how it did so, I will analyze how Binh Duong developed FDI-friendly institutions 
through the lens of local politics. 
Like in Ho Chi Minh City, the first reason behind Binh Duong’s FDI success is an early 
commitment within the PSC to welcome private investment after Doi Moi. Starting in 1990, 
when other provinces were still patiently watching market reforms at the national level, Binh 
Duong had already begun taking strides towards improving its investment climate. Whereas 
officials in other provinces were cautious towards the private sector, in fact, officials in Binh 
Duong would even offer personal resources to assist FIEs in completing registration paperwork 
and finding affordable land to start their projects (Nguyen, M. 2020). Like in Ho Chi Minh City, 
then Provincial Secretary Nguyen Minh Triet, who later served as the Provincial Secretary of Ho 
Chi Minh City and President of Vietnam, recalls that such closeness to the private sector raised 
significant backlashes from the central government. Even if it had already announced Doi Moi, 
the central did not want local governments to break away from political norms. After all, at that 
point in time, the conservative faction within the VCP was still skeptical of private sector actors 
and their potential to contribute to economic growth.  
Nonetheless, and like in Ho Chi Minh City, the Binh Duong PSC remained firm in face 
of criticisms from the central. At public conferences, the PSC willingly accepted any complaints 
from central officials for engaging the private sector, even declaring that they would remove 
officials from their posts if there were evidence of corruption. Behind the scenes, however, the 
Provincial Secretary and Chairman actively sponsored interactions with FIEs. In many cases, 
FIEs recall that it was these two leaders that approached them to discuss investment 
opportunities in the province, while it was a common practice for these leaders to visit key 
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private firms in the province on major holidays. Further, the province actively understated its 
growth and FDI attraction records to both the General Statistics Office and delegations from the 
Central Inspection Commission for over a decade, thus reducing the central’s attention towards 
its investment promotion success (Binh Duong’s Statistics Office 2010; Dapice 2021). By the 
time the central government recognized that investment promotion actually benefits economic 
growth, thus, Binh Duong had already laid the foundation for its success. 
The second reason behind Binh Duong’s FDI success after Doi Moi is continued 
improvements of its FDI institutions. Given the data constraint, I focus mainly on shifts in the 
official means of interactions between the PSC and the FDI sector. However, one must also 
recognize that these official events are often accompanied by backchanneling efforts and 
unrecorded informal meetings. Without sufficient evidence, however, discussing such informal 
efforts would not contribute any meaningful terms to our conversation. I divide these reforms 
into three groups for conceptual clarity. 
Within the bureaucracy 
Both the Party and PC have pursued various types of FDI reforms. In 1990, for instance, 
the Provincial Party Congress outright declared investment promotion as a key political goal, 
while the PSC has issued various Decrees stating specific policy targets to improve the quality of 
FDI institutions for each provincial government term (Nguyen, M. T. 2020). To boost 
transparency, the PC has published all legal regulations on investment, formation of businesses, 
labor, tax with accompanying explanation on the provincial website, even translating into various 
different foreign languages for ease of use (Binh Duong DPI 2005). To better grasp which areas 
of the economy had high potential for growth and areas where businesses were experiencing 
challenges, the PC has organized two meetings on the first and fifteenth of each month between 
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the Provincial Chairman and private businesses (including both domestic private businesses and 
FIEs) to discuss potential investment opportunities and firms’ concerns. Although some domestic 
firm owners remain skeptical of such fora, they have given FIEs a valuable platform to put direct 
pressure on local officials, a practice rarely seen in a country with such an insulated bureaucracy 
like Vietnam (Lam 2020). For instance, when an FIE reported that DPI officials were giving 
them false information about the local tax regime to extract bribes, the Chairman publicly 
denounced such a practice at the forum and subsequently recommended that the PSC remove the 
official from office (Binh Duong DPI 2005).  
Further, the PSC focused on improving internal policy coordination in investment 
promotion and management. Starting in 2005, when hosting major FIEs that were considering 
potential investments in the province, the Provincial Chairman would often invite the Provincial 
Secretary to co-direct the meeting, even inviting the entire PSC for key projects. With the 
Secretary’s comments already presented at the meeting to the potential, both the Provincial 
Chairman and Secretary would have already agreed on most matters regarding the project by the 
time they gather further inputs from the PSC. Such a practice, thus, reduced the steps needed for 
the local government to approve the project, while also demonstrating internal coherence to the 
private investors. For most investors, such a practice gave them a greater sense of certainty 
regarding the province’s support for their projects. For investors in larger projects, commitment 
from both the Provincial Secretary and Chairman also meant that they could trust that the 
province will help them navigate both the local and central bureaucracy. 
Beyond directly engaging FIEs and major businesses, at the end of the year, the PSC 
would also host a series of conferences to celebrate the ‘Binh Duong business day.’ Building 
upon the aforementioned reforms, the province made sure to engage with all businesses, with 
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even the smallest firms receiving attention from an appropriate government official. For both the 
Party and local government to actively engage the private sector, as FIE managers find, was both 
rare and bold within the Vietnamese political system (Lam 2020). Nonetheless, these practices 
proved to be successful, as they boosted FIEs’ trust in the local government and legal system. 
Placing Binh Duong’s practices into Wilhelms’ (1998) framework, the province’s FDI 
government fitness increased drastically during this period. 
Engaging the Private sector 
As the private sector in Binh Duong developed, starting in 2005, Binh Duong’s 
government-business fora began incorporating a wider range of actors, including labor unions 
and industry associations. As a result, the range of issues discussed also extended beyond those 
between the government and firms, even including labor and social issues. For instance, when a 
FIE in the textile industry reported that local residents were illegally constructing homes on their 
project site to seek compensation as if they were a displaced household, the local government 
took effective and immediate measures to constrain such practices.7 Given the complex nature of 
such a policy issue, however, managing the state-firm-civil society relationship can be a 
challenging task. An effective response, thus, needed to educate violators about the potential 
benefits of a new project, while also ensuring that the FIE improves its relations with local 
residents. In line with this sentiment, just one week after the meeting, the Binh Duong 
government organized a special delegation to educate local households about the potential 
 
7 According to the Land Law before 2015, if a private enterprise receives the provincial approval for a project that 
uses land that overlaps with private land, the government and firm had the responsibility to compensate for any 
value lost by the household from the transfer of land. In many cases, the province will ask the investor to construct a 
relocation area within their project site with adequate public infrastructure to host the displaced households. In many 
other cases, however, locals often view this policy framework as a potential means for extracting more money from 
businesses and the government. That is, once a project has been announced, they would construct more buildings 
within their land or illegally claim public land to receive higher compensation from the firm. 
 63 
benefits of having large-scale FDI projects in the province, focusing on their potential to create 
jobs for local households. In preparation for this meeting, the PSC also persuaded the FIE to 
promise retraining costs for households that had intruded on their project site as a means of 
showing its friendliness. Analyzing such a case, it is clear that the Binh Duong government was 
both responsive to businesses and politically adept when handling the government-business-civil 
society relationship.  
Binh Duong also invested heavily in public infrastructure to improve its investment 
climate. As mentioned in Chapter 5, between 1990 and 2000, Binh Duong directed large 
amounts of government expenditure to highway projects that connected the province to major 
ports and consumer hotspots in Ho Chi Minh City. For domestic suppliers, the high quality of 
infrastructure in Binh Duong meant that they could place their factory in a more rural location 
with cheap land use costs while still being able produce parts at competitive prices. To reduce 
the cost of labor, Binh Duong also diverted large amounts of public resources to construct 
affordable housing and develop the provincial public transportation system between 2000 and 
2005 (Binh Duong’s Statistics Office 2017). For laborers, the availability of affordable housing 
and public transportation meant that they did not have to incur the high cost of living in areas 
near their factories, while also being able to access the same benefits. As a result, the average 
wage in the province declined significantly. Examining Binh Duong’s reforms under Wilhelms’ 
(1998) framework, it is clear that these reforms significantly increased its FDI market fitness. By 
2005, thus, the province had become more attractive for investment versus others in the region.  
Improving the quality of labor 
Beyond streamlining the bureaucracy and creating a favorable environment for 
businesses, Binh Duong also focused on improving the quality of labor in the province. First, the 
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local government welcomed both public and private investments in vocational schools, with 
private schools even receiving preferential treatment in terms of licensing, construction rights 
and land use rights approval (Nguyen, T. 2020). With such favorable conditions, thus, the private 
sector actively took advantage of the opportunity to invest in their own vocational schools, 
accounting to 21 of the province’s 41 schools (Vu and Do 2012). Of these schools, 12 had some 
form of foreign participation, either through direct ownership or partnership to outsource 
training. As many investors noted, being able to own their own vocational schools meant that 
they were able to determine what laborers learned and adapt those skills to their businesses. Such 
a practice significantly reduced the amount of time a new laborer needed to adapt to the firm’s 
environment, boosting overall productivity.  
Second, Binh Duong focused on training displaced residents and attracting migrant labor 
to boost its labor supply. For members of displaced households who were relocated to create 
clean land banks, Binh Duong retrained and helped them look for new jobs. As part of its rural 
development strategy, in fact, the province offers displaced personnel free training tuitions, while 
also offering them a direct transfer of 10.000 VND/day (equivalent of 0.5 USD) during their 
training time and guaranteeing them a fulltime job at the end of their training. Between 2004 to 
2008, the province trained 7035 laborers, with over 80% receiving offers for full-time positions 
upon graduation from the program (Vu and Do 2012). For migrant labor, the province dedicates 
approximately 1 billion VND/year (equivalent of 50,000 USD) from its annual budget to attract 
and support those coming from other provinces. Although the specific expenditure varies from 
year to year, much of this cost often goes to transportation cost, preliminary expenses for migrant 
labor, and training cost to help them assimilate to the province’s working conditions.  
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Third, the province incentivized large businesses to improve the living conditions for 
migrant and local laborers. In terms of legal regulations, several provincial decrees mandate 
firms that want to invest in any industrial parks to dedicate between 10 to 15 percent of the land 
transferred by the province for affordable housing, while also offering additional direct cash 
transfers for projects that dedicate a higher portion of their land bank to construct affordable 
houses (PSC 2006; PC 2007). In practice, key investors in the industrial park sectors have all 
complied with such a regulation, with firms such as BECAMEX and VSIP even dedicating a 
greater portion of their project sites for affordable houses as a means of boosting their 
comparative advantage versus other industrial parks in the region (Nguyen, H. 2020). Even if 
many affordable housing areas are located in key industrial hotspots, thus, their average sale 
value remains between 20 to 30 percent of the actual market value, while general utility costs 
have also been subsidized by both the local and central government budget (Binh Duong’s 
Statistics Office 2017). For laborers, affordable living costs has made Binh Duong a more 
attractive destination, thus explaining its high rate of internal migration.  
Fourth, the Binh Duong government actively lobbied for improvements in working 
conditions for laborers. Notably, since Vietnam’s political system does not recognize firm-level 
labor unions, Party organizations such as the Ho Chi Minh Youth League (HCMYL), the 
Provincial Labor Union and Department of Labor (DOL) have had to take up the task of 
representing laborers' interests. In Binh Duong, the PSC mandates that these organizations 
engage with random worker groups prior to the monthly and annual meetings with businesses to 
better understand their needs. As many HCMYL and DOL officials recall, during these meetings, 
laborers often voiced their concerns about poor working conditions and declining wages among 
many FIEs even as their tenure increased (Nguyen, M. T. 2020). In return, the aforementioned 
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organizations would discuss these issues with FIEs, ensuring that they receive sufficient checks 
on their treatment of laborers. In essence, thus, the Binh Duong government has done both a 
good job of directly providing for its laborers, while also solving the issue of representation for 
labor at the firm and industry-level. 
Fifth, Binh Duong attracted skilled labor to spur knowledge spillover for the local labor 
force. Starting in 2008, the province offered a 500.000VND/month (about 30 USD) direct cash 
transfer to high performing students in Ho Chi Minh City’s engineering schools for two years in 
exchange for their commitment to teach in the province for at least two years after they graduate. 
By 2013, over 1,000 students were participating in the program, while many graduates have 
found stable jobs within the local economy even after completing their years of service. Further, 
Binh Duong has invested in five universities and established two branches for universities in Ho 
Chi Minh City. Of these universities, four focus on developing STEM graduates, while the 
Eastern Region International University trains laborers for projects in BECAMEX’s industrial 
zones. In this sense, Binh Duong’s policy framework on training and education, albeit still has 
room for further development, successfully takes into account the need for knowledge spillovers 
and has sufficiently solved the questions of ‘where, how, and who to train local laborers?’ 
Analyzing such a framework under Wilhelm’s (1998) theory, Binh Duong’s emphasis on 
developing its education and training facilities has successfully increased its education fitness, 
which then increased the quality of labor and thus its market fitness. 
Connecting Labor, Firm, and Government 
Another key success in Binh Duong’s new FDI framework is its ability to connect the 
labor force, the government and firms. Unlike in other provinces, each of these actors had a 
specific set of mandatory commitments and guaranteed benefits when participating in Binh 
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Duong’s development scheme (Figure 12). As mentioned, the government supported FIEs and 
subsidized training programs. FIEs, in return, had an obligation to co-develop training curricula 
with vocational schools in the provinces. During the training process, which usually lasted 
between three and six months depending on the trainees’ existing skillset, FIEs then had an 
obligation to inspect the quality of laborers and offer internships for graduates. For some major 
industries, including textile and technological assembly, training programs would also be held in 
industrial zones with high concentration of firms in such industries. For firms, the availability of 
such public goods significantly reduced their cost of training, while also ensuring a sufficient 
supply of skilled yet cheap local labor. For local laborers, guaranteed employment significantly 
reduced the opportunity cost of leaving their current job, which was mostly in agriculture, to opt 
into training programs. Once they received basic skills, their prospects for upward mobility and 
opportunities in the labor market increased significantly. For the government, such a program 
boosted the local rate of education, reduced unemployment rates, while also increasing general 
living standards for local residents. By ensuring that all participants benefit from their policy 
scheme, Binh Duong has raised its FDI institutional fitness significantly. 
Synthesizing the aforementioned reforms, it is clear that for Binh Duong, private 
businesses, especially FIEs, were no longer a source for extraction after Doi Moi. By the 2000s, 
scandals about Binh Duong officials demanding bribes or involvement in major corruption 
schemes were nonexistent. Instead, the local government pioneered all different forms of policy 
initiatives to improve its FDI institutions. Throughout this process, it created strong linkages 
between the government, FIEs and laborers. Specifically, it ensured that all actors benefited from 
its policy initiatives, while also contributing to local economic development. Without such a 
committed and engaged leadership, such an FDI-friendly policy framework would not have 
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developed. The important factor for nearby provinces watching Binh Duong’s rapid growth, 
thus, is not only that it was able to take advantage of its geographic proximity to Ho Chi Minh 
City nor that it was able to take advantage of existing cheap labor in the province. Rather, and 
like in Ho Chi Minh City before Doi Moi, it was the commitment to economic reforms that 
determined its success. Political entrepreneurship, thus, remains key to determining why some 
provinces receive much higher FDI inflows that others. 
Conclusion 
 Starting in the 1990s, FDI inflows to Vietnam experienced a sharp increase at the 
national level. Yet despite such a positive sign, the provincial distribution of FDI remains 
skewed towards few provinces, while the gap between the Southeast and the Red River Delta and 
the remainder of the country has widened since. Existing political and economic centers such as 
Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi and a few entrepreneurial provinces such as Binh Duong or Vinh 
Phuc, in particular, receive much higher FDI inflows than other provinces. At the same time, 
increased FDI inflows is also strongly correlated with the rise in domestic investment and rising 
wages for local laborers. In this sense, FDI is actually increasing the disparities in development 
within the local economy. In the previous chapter, I have argued that the shifting dynamics 
between different levels of the government following Doi Moi created opportunities for local 
political entrepreneurs to pursue FDI reforms.  
In this chapter, I add another dimension to my ‘politics of FDI reforms’ paradigm and 
focus on local-led initiatives that improved the relationship between FIEs and the local 
government. Surveying the politics of economic and FDI reforms in two provinces, I found that 
developing a business-friendly attitude was key to determining the province’s level of FDI 
inflows. Subsequently, I argue that this attitude can develop either before or after Doi Moi, using 
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Ho Chi Minh City’s ‘jumping the fences initiatives’ and Binh Duong’s post-Doi Moi FDI 
reforms as my case studies. My findings, in this sense, suggest that political leadership, 
especially by the PSC, is key to inducing the necessary changes to create a business-friendly 
environment. In Ho Chi Minh City, the PSC colluded with the private sector to shift central 
leaders’ minds about private economic actors in the years leading up to Doi Moi. Their policy 
initiative, in return, laid the foundation for FDI-friendly institutions to develop after Doi Moi. 
For Binh Duong, the PSC committed to changes that benefitted FIEs and laborers, 
acknowledging that they are key contributors to the province’s growth. In both of these 
provinces, increased FDI inflows led to rapid growth, both in absolute and per capita terms. 
These two success stories, thus, provide key lessons for the central government as it considers 
how to better the country’s FDI attraction framework.  
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7. Conclusion 
Trends in FDI politics 
 The above chapters have discussed the politics of FDI in Vietnam between 1977 and 
2015. In the early stages of this discussion, FDI played a minimal role in influencing economic 
growth and domestic politics in Vietnam. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the legal framework 
towards FDI during this era prevented high-quality projects from flowing into the country, while 
the centralized decision-making hierarchy described in Chapter 4 prevented local governments 
from developing their own FDI attraction initiatives. FIEs’ interactions with the local economy, 
thus, was minimal. In terms of politics, most, if not all reforms and political developments came 
from the central level, notably changes led by the reformist faction within the VCP. FDI inflows 
and effect on the local political economy, thus, was minimal.  
Nonetheless, much has changed since Vietnam announced Doi Moi. Today, the local 
economy comprises various economic actors, both private and public, all engaged with the 
country’s developmental goals. Throughout this shift, FDI’s role also changed drastically over 
time. Within this new economic model, FDI contributes to between 4 and 10 percent of 
Vietnam’s GDP, even rising up to 12 percent in 1993 (GSO 2020). In terms of its contribution to 
job creation, FDI makes up an average of 22 percent of employment in the top 10 provinces in 
terms of FDI attraction (GSO 2020). In the FDI success case of Binh Duong, more notably, FDI 
employs between 30 and 35 percent of the province’s labor force, while also serving as the main 
source for attracting migrant labor from other provinces (Binh Duong’s Statistics Office 2019). 
So much so, even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, FDI continues to flow into Vietnam 
at high rates, while many existing investors are considering expanding their operations in 
Vietnam in face of declining growth in their home country (Lam 2020). 
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FDI’s role in domestic politics, too, have changed. In many provinces, the demands 
outlined by FIEs have incentivized reforms that improved the quality of local institutions. In Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau, for instance, FDI reforms between 2005 and 2015 improved the investment 
climate for both domestic and FIEs. In other provinces, FDI has helped the local government 
outline and implement more aggressive growth policies. As discussed in Chapter 4 and 6, Binh 
Duong worked with FIEs in upgrading its industrial capacity, while also allowing firms to bear 
the burden of education and training in the province, thus improving the quality of life for local 
and migrant laborers. Contrary to its previous insignificance, thus, FDI now plays a more 
important role in domestic politics.  
 The path to having such a vibrant FDI sector was not linear, nor was it as speedy as 
reformists in the VCP or FIEs had wanted. Rather, it was filled with political gambles and 
challenges at both the central and local levels. As mentioned in Chapter 4, it was a political 
gamble by a single central government official that sparked the creation of the first FDI 
attraction framework in Vietnam. At the local level, it was the continuous attempts by the Ho Chi 
Minh City PSC to convince central leaders that the private sector can contribute to development 
described in Chapter 5 that triggered Doi Moi. When FDI reforms and reforms in general stalled 
at the national level in the subsequent years, political entrepreneurship at the local level 
differentiated several provinces from the remainder of the country.  
In the South, Binh Duong, Ho Chi Minh City and Ba Ria-Vung Tau were the first movers 
in FDI attraction. Although the FDI attraction framework differed in these three provinces, all 
took advantage of institutional advantages to develop their FDI institutions. For Ho Chi Minh 
City, commitment by the PSC to remove any challenges facing the private sector started even 
before Doi Moi, laying the foundation for its subsequent FDI success. In Binh Duong, committed 
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local leaders insulated from the central’s criticisms engaged the FDI sector, while also creating a 
high-quality labor force to support FIEs. Simply put, Binh Duong facilitated a policy scheme that 
improved benefits for firms, laborers, and the government itself. As a result, the province 
continuously ranks among the highest in the country in terms of net FDI inflows. In Ba Ria-
Vung Tau, internal stability between 2005 and 2015 helped the province outline, prepare and 
execute a development plan centered around attracting private investment, notably FDI. In the 
North, Ha Noi, Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh were notable successes. Although not discussed in this 
paper, for Vinh Phuc and Bac Ninh, the key to success is similar to that in Binh Duong and Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau. That is, local governments in provinces connected the province’s clean land bank 
with financial and education infrastructure in Ha Noi and ports in Hai Phong, thus increasing 
their FDI attraction capacity. Even more, local governments gradually stopped treating FIEs as 
potential sources of extraction, but rather as a potential contributor to economic development. As 
a result, FDI inflows to these provinces were much higher than the regional average. 
Policy implications 
Through these institutional stories, the single most important factor influencing FDI 
inflows in Vietnam appears to be political leadership. At the central level, this came clearest in 
the form of advocating for and pioneering legal reforms to improve FDI institutions. Prior to the 
2005 Investment Law, continuous revisions of the 1987 Foreign Investment Law kickstarted the 
first wave of FDI into the country. Once explicit legal reforms were no longer politically viable, 
the central government then masked FDI reforms beneath institutional reforms that improved the 
investment climate as a whole. Equal treatment before the law for FDI and domestic firms as 
outlined by the 2005 Investment Law, for instance, reduced the political risk of investing in 
Vietnam for many potential FIEs and discrepancies in the local management of FDI. Tax 
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revisions, too, improved Vietnam’s attractiveness to potential FIEs versus other countries in the 
region. In another sense, the political courage to accept reforms at the local level was also key to 
FDI success. Had the central leadership not accepted Ho Chi Minh City’s ‘jumping the fences 
initiatives’ prior to Doi Moi or allowed Binh Duong to experiment with new economic 
management models, the effects of reforms on FDI would not be so profound. 
At the local level, political leadership in success cases came mostly from the PSC, most 
notably from the Provincial Secretary and Chairman. Specifically, these actors needed to 1) 
maintain internal stability, 2) establish FDI attraction as a key goal, and 3) direct policy 
initiatives to execute its development plans. The cases of Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong and Ba 
Ria-Vung Tau all confirm this theory. Indeed, the second wave of FDI success cases have 
learned from this model. After a key decision by the 2010-2015 PSC to shift its focus on trading 
along the Cambodian border to attracting investments from the Ho Chi Minh City area, the 
Southern province of Tay Ninh has recorded a significant rise in FDI inflows. During this 
process, the province has asked Binh Duong for help in setting up training centers and affordable 
residential areas to attract migrant laborers. Indeed, the challenges facing Tay Ninh are not 
identical to that Binh Duong or Ho Chi Minh City had encountered. Nonetheless, these policy 
initiatives have pushed Tay Ninh in the right direction.  
Similarly, Long An, a province situated in between Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong 
River Delta, has recently shifted from focusing on agriculture to developing industries that can 
receive spillover effects from the Ho Chi Minh City region after its leaders finally found an 
internal consensus. Anticipating the decline in land availability and rising land prices in Ho Chi 
Minh City and Binh Duong’s industrial zones, Long An put aside political infighting and 
increased its industrial park land bank by almost three times between 2010 and 2015. During this 
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same period, public investments focused on connecting local ports and logistics stations to major 
ports in Ho Chi Minh City, reducing the cost of transportation for most goods. Today, Long An 
is beginning to establish itself as an emerging textile production and agricultural processing 
center for the Mekong River Delta. 
In the North, Bac Giang, Bac Ninh and Thai Binh have learned from Bac Ninh and Vinh 
Phuc’s success. Specifically, they have stopped treating FIEs as sources of extraction, rather 
focusing on public investments of infrastructure connecting to Ha Noi, the regional financial 
center and the country’s capital and Hai Phong, the regional transportation hub. Even more, they 
have partnered with FIEs and domestic private firms to invest in training programs for migrant 
laborers. Whereas labor attraction programs in the Southern provinces focused on attracting 
laborers from the Central and Southern regions of the country, labor attractions programs in the 
North focus on laborers in the Red River Delta and the Northern Central provinces of Nghe An, 
Ha Tinh and Thanh Hoa. Provinces that seek to improve their FDI attraction record, thus, can 
surely learn from these cases. 
 Like the case of China, the politics of FDI in Vietnam suggests that success in FDI 
attraction is mostly a local story. In both cases, reforms at the national level have shown less 
success than local reforms. Open Economic Zones in Vietnam and SEZs in China, for instance, 
have been less important agents in spurring FDI than institutional reforms that improved the 
overall investment climate. Even more, legal breakthroughs at the national levels such as the 
1987 Foreign Investment Law of the 2005 Investment would not have been so successful had 
local governments not implemented innovative policy measures to complement these legal 
openings. As argued in Chapter 5 and 6, local political entrepreneurship was key to why some 
provinces developed better FDI institutions than others, thus accounting for their higher FDI 
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inflows. From a comparative perspective, the lesson learned from both countries, thus, is that 
motivated and capable local leadership, openness to new policy ideas, and state capacity for 
policy implementation is key to FDI success. 
Outlook 
Nonetheless, despite Vietnam’s success in FDI attraction since Doi Moi, many challenges 
lie ahead. For instance, better management of FDI’s negative environmental externalities is 
needed, especially in resource extraction industries. After all, this remains a major problem in 
provinces were FDI has been politically motivated, and thus has little incentives to benefit the 
local economy. Even more, the level of technological spillover from FIEs to private local firms 
remain low, while high-quality laborers in FDI firms are mostly foreign expats. In terms of FDI’s 
contribution to the local economy, the percent of profit that is re-invested in the country remains 
relatively low compared to other countries in the region (World Bank 2020), while the legal 
framework still restricts FDI from contributing to emerging sectors such as tech and finance.  
At the local level, many provinces with high potential for FDI attraction still have not 
developed the necessary institutions to actualize their potential. Even with legal advantages such 
as the Chu Lai OEZ, for instance, Quang Nam has not registered such high levels of FDI inflows. 
Even more, a relatively underdeveloped domestic private sector and a lack of domestic financing 
for FDI firms discourage many potential FIEs from investing in Vietnam (Bui 2020). As the 
COVID-19 pandemic creates a new global order, potential opportunities will arise. In fact, citing 
Vietnam’s success in managing the pandemic, key political leaders and business owners have 
already noted Vietnam’s potential to receive a new wave of FDI inflows in the upcoming years. 
To do so, however, it has to address the aforementioned challenges, while also continuing to 
reform local institutions to boost its FDI fitness.  
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Figure 1. FDI rise in absolute terms 
 
Figure 2. FDI vs. GDP 
 
Figure 3. FDI as a share of total investments 
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Figure 5. Vietnam’s FDI Institutional Arrangement 
 Period 
Relative Power 1975-1990 1990-2015 
High Central-Party Local-State 
Low Local-State Central-Party 
Figure 6. Relative power in FDI decision-making over time 
Year No. of Project 
Registered capital 
(US millions) 





1988-1990 211 1603   
1991 152 1284 428 2.99 
1992 196 2077 575 3.61 
1993 274 2830 1118 2.53 
1994 372 4262 2241 1.90 
1995 415 7925 2792 2.84 
1996 372 9635 2938 3.28 
1997 349 5956 3277 1.82 
1998 285 4873 2372 2.05 
1999 327 2283 2528 0.90 
2000 391 2763 2399 1.51 
2001 555 3266 2226 1.47 
2002 808 2993 2885 1.04 
2003 791 3173 2723 1.17 
2004 811 4534 2708 1.67 
2005 970 6840 3301 2.07 
2006 987 12005 4100 2.93 
2007 1544 21349 8034 2.66 
2008 1171 71727 11500 6.24 
2009 1208 23107 10000 2.31 
2010 1237 19887 11000 1.81 
2011 1186 15998 11000 1.42 
2012 1287 16348 10046 1.63 
2013 1530 22352 11500 1.94 
2014 1843 21921 12500 1.75 
2015 2120 24115 14500 1.66 
2016 2613 26981 15800 1.70 
2017 2741 37101 17500 2.12 
2018 3147 36368 19100 1.90 
2019 4028 38951 20380 1.911 
Figure 7. Key data on FDI (national level) 
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Figure 8. Registered vs. Committed FDI capital 
 
Figure 9. Tax reforms vs. FDI inflows 
 
Figure 10. Average size of FDI project 
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As of 31/12/2019 No. of Projects Registered Capital (USD million) 
Red River Delta 10315 105756.9 
Ha Noi 5970 34343.7 
Vinh Phuc 417 5078.9 
Bac Ninh 1518 18962.2 
Quang Ninh 129 6317 
Hai Duong 452 8178 
Hai Phong 779 18746.6 
Hung Yen 470 4899.4 
Thai Binh 87 706.4 
Ha Nam 310 3621.5 
Nam Dinh 109 3506.6 
Ninh Binh 74 1396.6 
Northern highlands 1047 18196.1 
Ha Giang 6 4.1 
Cao Bang 18 52.4 
Bac Kan 4 6.3 
Tuyen Quang 16 204.1 
Lao Cai 30 576.4 
Yen Bai 24 392 
Thai Nguyen 158 8297.6 
Lang Son 42 238.2 
Bac Giang 505 5977.2 
Phu Tho 182 1596.9 
Dien Bien 1 3 
Lai Chau 1 1.5 
Son La 10 135.7 
Hoa Binh 50 710.7 
Northern and coastal central 1970 58523.7 
Thanh Hoa 143 14191.2 
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Nghe An 95 2158.1 
Ha Tinh 77 11729 
Quang Binh 20 766.6 
Quang Tri 19 85 
Thua Thien Hue 116 3856.2 
Da Nang 775 5534.9 
Quang Nam 218 6126.5 
Quang Ngai 61 1844.7 
Binh Dinh 87 802.5 
Phu Yen 47 1989.4 
Khanh Hoa 113 4298.5 
Ninh Thuan 52 1710.8 
Binh Thuan 147 3430.3 
Central highlands 147 932.3 
Kon Tum 9 93.9 
Gia Lai 6 12.2 
Dak Lak 16 153.5 
Dak Nong 13 152.1 
Lam Dong 103 520.6 
Southeast 15707 153782.2 
Binh Phuoc 276 2812.1 
Tay Ninh 323 6990.4 
Binh Duong 3778 34341.6 
Dong Nai 1662 31233.1 
Ba Ria-Vung Tau 466 31025.9 
Ho Chi Minh City 9202 47379.1 
Mekong River Delta 1707 23065.3 
Long An 1170 7900.8 
Tien Giang 117 2581.2 
Ben Tre 64 1079.4 
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Tra Vinh 43 3330.7 
Vinh Long 62 741.6 
Dong Thap 18 168.7 
An Giang 26 267.6 
Kien Giang 60 4802.2 
Can Tho 85 725.8 
Hau Giang 23 519.8 
Soc Trang 15 247.4 
Bac Lieu 13 553.4 
Ca Mau 11 146.7 
Oil & Gas Exploration 50 2768.7 
Figure 11. Cumulative FDI attraction by region and province 
Actor Role Benefit 
Government - Support FIEs in investment 
registration and licensing 
- Invest in infrastructure 
- Organize vocation training schools 
- Economic development 
FIEs - Inspect training programs 
- Ensure adequate working conditions 
for the labor force 
- Meet all environmental and legal 
regulations 
- Ease of doing business 
Labor force - Cooperate with the government and 
firms during the relocation and 
training process 
- Higher employment rate 
- Higher wages 
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